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INTRODUCTION
[E]mployers and employees know the footing on which they have contracted:
the phrase "at will" is two words long and has the convenient virtue of mean-
ing just what it says, no more and no less.1
The assumption that workers understand the legal basis on which
they have contracted lies at the heart of the traditional economic de-
fense of the at-will rule in employment.2 As Richard Epstein and
others have argued, employers and employees bargain with full infor-
t Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis; A.B. 1984,
Harvard University; J.D. 1988, Harvard Law School. A grant from the Fund for Labor
Relations Studies supported this study. My thanks to Jason Mazer and Jeffrey Chod, who
provided invaluable research assistance, to Michael Bischof and Lauretta Conklin, who
assisted me with the statistical analysis, and to Ian Ayres, Samuel Issacharoff, Lynn LoPucki,
Michael Selmi, Stewart Schwab, and my many colleagues here at Washington University
School of Law, who offered helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Wll, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 955
(1984).
2 See, e.g., id.; Mayer G. Freed& Daniel D. Polsby, Just Causefor Termination Rules and
Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1098 (1989); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad
Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEx. L. Rav. 1901, 1929
(1996); J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 837, 874-75.
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mation in their own best interests, and, therefore, the prevalence of
at-will contracts in the real world represents an efficient outcome, re-
flecting the desires of the parties. 3 While many commentators have
questioned the assumption that workers are legally informed,4 the de-
bate has been characterized by a remarkable dearth of empirical in-
formation.5 This study, by directly testing workers' knowledge of the
relevant legal rules, offers empirical evidence contradicting the as-
sumption of full information commonly made by defenders6 of the at-
will rule. Far from understanding "the footing on which they have
contracted,"7 workers appear to systematically overestimate the pro-
tections afforded by law, believing that they have far greater rights
against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they in fact have under an
at-will contract.
As Epstein suggests, the at-will rule is easily stated: absent a con-
tract of employment for a fixed term, an employer may discharge its
employees at will "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause mor-
ally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."8 The doc-
trine merely states a default rule, providing a ready presumption when
an employment contract is silent as to its duration. In theory, em-
3 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 953-55.
4 See, e.g., Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42 HAs-
TINGS LJ. 135, 137 (1990); Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termina-
tion, 66 N.C. L. RE v. 631, 674 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity:
A Comment 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1041, 1055 (1984); Steven L. Willborn, IndividualEmployment
Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. Rxv. 101, 128
(1988).
5 Commentators on both sides of the debate have noted the lack of empirical evi-
dence on the level of employee information regarding job security. See, e.g., Verkerke,
supra note 2, at 886-88; Willborn, supra note 4, at 128 n.87.
6 Throughout this Article, I refer to "defenders" and "critics" of the at-will rule.
Although this terminology oversimplifies the debate, the labels are nevertheless useful for
identifying broad positions. Thus, I include among the "critics" all those arguing for
change in the at-will rule, whether they call for judicial action or statutory reform, and
whether they advocate a mandatory just-cause requirement or merely a rebuttable pre-
sumption. The "defenders" similarly encompass a range of opinions as to the appropriate-
ness of the at-will rule and exceptions to it, yet all share a belief in the basic soundness of
the traditional rule. Not all commentators, however, are easily classified. For example,
Dau-Schmidt shares the critics' skepticism about the efficiency of the individual bargaining
process, but questions whether alternative institutions can better accommodate employer
and employee preferences. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment Security: A Comparative
Institutional Debate, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1645 (1996). Also difficult to classify is Schwab's life-
cycle analysis, which "does not categorically condemn or celebrate employment at will,"
but sees coherence in the courts' willingness to find contract protections against discharge
at the beginning and end of an employee's career, while applying the at-will rule at mid-
career. StewartJ. Schwab, Life-CycleJustice: AccommodatingJust Cause and Employment at Will,
92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 61 (1993).
7 Epstein, supra note 1, at 955.
8 Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915). Payne is not an employment
case, but provides the classic summary of the meaning of employment at will.
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ployer and employee are free to contract around the at-will presump-
tion, but, in fact, very few do so. Although collective bargaining
agreements negotiated by unions typically include just-cause protec-
tions against discharge, in the world of individual employment agree-
ments, fixed-term contracts are unusual and indefinite-term just-cause
contracts are rarer still. Thus, the vast majority of nonunion, private
sector workers are employed at will.9
In the early part of this century, the law governing termination
was so well settled that discharges from employment generated very
little litigation' ° and virtually no commentary." Then, in a 1967 arti-
cle, Blades argued that the traditional common-law rule rendered em-
ployees vulnerable to employer coercion, 12 kindling a debate over the
at-will rule in employment. Since then, a growing chorus of academic
commentators has condemned the rule, calling for its abandonment,
either through judicial action or statutory reform.13 Many critics fo-
9 Employment at will is the default rule in every American jurisdiction except Mon-
tana, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. See Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employ-
ment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (1997); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a-
185m (1995); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (1997).
Of course, the at-will employee is not wholly unprotected against discharge. A
number of statutes prohibit discharges for certain illegal reasons. For example, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994), forbids discharge be-
cause of an employee's race, color, religion, sex, or natural origin, and the National Labor
Relations Act outlaws retaliatory discharge of an employee for exercising rights under the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). Similarly, most states recognize an exception to the at-will
rule when the employer's motive for discharge violates a clear public policy. See 9A Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51 to :52 (1997). Although numerous, the exceptions to the at-will
rule are quite narrow and often difficult to prove. Because of these difficulties of proof,
some commentators argue that the background presumption of employment at will under-
mines the effectiveness of antidiscrimination legislation and other wrongful discharge pro-
tections. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74
TEx. L. REv. 1655 (1996); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Wilk
Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHio ST. L.J. 1443 (1996).
10 See Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the
Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. Rxv. 679, 688 n.25 (1994).
11 Today, however, the very origins of the at-will rule are the subject of controversy.
See, e.g.,Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at WillRul 20 AM.J. LEGAL HisT.
118 (1976); Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United
States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85 (1982); see also Mayer G. Freed
& Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 551
(1990) (asserting that the employment at will rule was well accepted in 1877 when Wood
formally articulated it in his treatise, The Law of Master and Servant); Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 Aiuz. ST. LJ. 733 (1991) (refuting
Freed & Polsby's assertion that Wood's rule was generally accepted at the time and arguing
that the rule was an innovation that led courts to view skeptically employees' contractual
claims); J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. Rxv. 335, 341-43 (1974) (arguing that the at-will rule articulated in Wood's treatise
was not supported by the cases or any analysis).
12 Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abu-
sive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967).
13 Several commentators have suggested that courts should abandon the common-law
presumption of employment at will and replace it with either a rebuttable presumption
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cus on the perceived unfairness of the rule. 14 Pointing to the just-
cause provisions found in most collective bargaining agreements and
the civil service protections afforded public employees, they argue
that no justification exists for denying private, nonunion employees
comparable protections.' 5 Those advocating change also invoke the
experiences of other industrialized countries, which limit employers'
power of discharge, to support arguments for giving employees
greater tenure rights.' 6 In short, the critics contend that the at-will
rule is unsuited to modern conditions and out of sync with contempo-
rary values of a humane workplace.
More recently, the battle over the at-will rule has been joined on
grounds of economic efficiency. Epstein fired an early salvo, arguing
that, far from being an unfair, one-sided bargain, the at-will employ-
ment relationship represents an efficient accommodation of both em-
ployer and employee interests. 17 The rule's critics counter that at-will
arrangements are not so much the result of an efficient contracting
process as the imposition by the party with superior bargaining power
of its preferred terms.' 8 Moreover, they argue, by curbing managerial
abuse and increasing employee loyalty, just-cause protections might
ultimately result in a net efficiency gain for the firm.19
At the center of this debate lies the simple fact that the vast ma-
jority of nonunion, private sector employees are employed at will. For
that an employer may not terminate an employee without just cause, see, e.g., Leonard,
supra note 4, or a mandatory just cause standard, see, e.g., Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Dis-
charges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHio ST. LJ. 1 (1979). Others
have argued for either state or federal legislation to establish just-cause protections for
employees. See, e.g., Janice R Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guaran-
tee, 16 U. MICH.J.L. RFORM 207 (1983); William B. Gould rV, TheIdea of the Job asProperty in
Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L. Rr-v. 885,
908-12; Grodin, supra note 4; Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge
Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REv. 56, 70-81 (1988); Jack Stieber & Michael
Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 319 (1983); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissak Time
for a Statute 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 519-31 (1976).
14 For example, St. Antoine invokes the "piercing hurt to individuals" who are un-
justly fired to justify the call for reform. St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 67. In arguing for
abandonment of the at-will rule, others rely on estimates of the large number of workers
who are discharged without cause. See Peck, supra note 13, at 8-10; Stieber & Murray, supra
note 13, at 322-24.
15 See, e.g., Summers, supra note 13, at 519-20.
16 See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, Job Security in the United States: Some Reflections on Unfair
Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation from a Comparative Perspective, 67 NEB. L. Rxv. 28, 50-54
(1988); Grodin, supra note 4, at 136-37; Jack Stieber, Protection Against Unfair Dismissak A
Comparative View, 3 CoMp. LAB. L. 229 (1980); Summers, supra note 13, at 508-19.
17 Epstein, supra note 1.
18 See, e.g., Blades, supra note 12, at 1411-12; Clyde W. Summers, The Contract ofEmploy-
ment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Wll, 52
FoRDHAm L. REv. 1082, 1106-07 (1984).
19 See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 4, at 676-78.
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defenders of the at-will rule, the predominance of at-will arrange-
ments attests to their economic superiority.20 For critics of the rule, it
is symptomatic of the breakdown of the market.21 Each side has spun
out competing theories to explain the prevalence of at-will employ-
ment agreements, purporting to demonstrate either the robustness of
the individual bargaining process or the various market failures that
beset it. As this debate over the at-will rule has advanced, it has taken
on an increasingly speculative air. Each side makes assumptions about
real world conditions, which, if they held true, would inevitably lead to
the intended normative conclusion. However, with only a few excep-
tions, little effort has been made to test these assumptions
empirically. 22
One critical assumption in the debate over the at-will rule con-
cerns what employees know going into the hiring process. Defenders
of the at-will rule generally assume that employees are fully informed
of the background legal rules as well as the risks of discharge they face
with particular employers.23 For example, Epstein quickly dismisses
the possibility that workers are confused about the law.2 4 Morriss is
likewise skeptical: "One obvious characteristic of the at-will rule is that
the legal responsibilities of the employer are clear-it has none. How
then are employees systematically fooled?"2 5 Similarly, in arguing that
workers "choose among potential employers in part on the basis of
20 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 955-57; Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1097-98.
21 See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORPILACE: THE FurURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 72-74 (1990); Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited
Return of the Common Law, 74 TFx. L. REV. 1783, 1794 (1996); Walter Kamiat, Labor and
Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible Failures of Individual Con-
tracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1957 (1996).
22 Of course, the arguments against the at-will rule based on comparisons with either
the just-cause provisions of collective bargaining agreements, or the legal protections
against unjust dismissals in other countries, rest on a sort of empirical data. My concern
here is with the lack of empirical studies that systematically test the competing assumptions
made about the operation of the labor market when it comes to job security provisions.
Notable exceptions include Issacharoff's recent efforts to bring the insights of cognitive
psychology to bear on the problem of contracting for employment security, Issacharoff,
supra note 21, at 1800-03, and Schwab's experimental exploration of the efficiency and
distributive effects of a contract presumption in the context of labor bargaining. Stewart
Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1988).
23 The market-based defense of the at-will rule does not require that each employee
know the relevant legal rules-only that a sufficient number have adequate information to
allow the market to operate competitively. SeeAlan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening
in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 630 (1979). For ease of reference, I will refer to this assumption as one of "full infor-
mation," even though perfect information is not necessary. In Part V below, I consider in
greater detail the argument that a competitive market may persist in the face of imperfect
information and examine that claim for the labor market in light of my empirical findings.
24 Epstein, supra note 1, at 955.
25 Morriss, supra note 2, at 1929. However obvious the meaning of the at-will rule may
be to a law professor, it is not at all certain that it will be clear to the layperson. In any case,
it is hardly a correct statement that an employer has no legal responsibility toward the at-
1997]
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their policies concerning discharge," 26 Verkerke assumes that workers
have the necessary information about prospective employers to make
a meaningful choice.
Critics of the at-will rule, by contrast, dispute the assumption that
workers have adequate information, arguing that they are likely mis-
taken about the law and misled by their employers at the time of hir-
ing as to the risks of discharge they are likely to face.27 One
hypothesis is that the various restrictions that the law has imposed on
employers-for example, forbidding discharge based on race or sex-
have engendered broader expectations on the part of employees that
the law protects them from all arbitrary dismissals. 28 Whatever the
cause of these inflated expectations, they prevent employees from rec-
ognizing the value of guarantees of job security and, therefore, from
seeking to secure such protections by contract.
These differing assumptions are crucial because they underlie the
divergent conclusions drawn from the observed prevalence of at-will
arrangements in the real world. In the absence of any empirical data
on the issue, each side has been free to make the assumptions that
tend to support its normative conclusions. This study represents a
first step in filling this data gap. It consists of a written survey adminis-
tered to over 330 unemployed workers in the St. Louis metropolitan
area. By presenting a series of simple scenarios and asking respon-
dents whether the particular discharges described are lawful, the sur-
vey directly tests their knowledge of the default rule of employment at
will.
The survey results offer a striking contrast to the assumption of
full information commonly made by defenders of the at-will rule. As
detailed in Part IV below, respondents overwhelmingly misunderstand
the background legal rules governing the employment relationship.
More specifically, they consistently overestimate the degree of job pro-
tection afforded by law, believing that employees have far greater
rights not to be fired without good cause than they in fact have. For
example, although the common law rule clearly permits an employer
to terminate an at-will employee out of personal dislike, so long as no
discriminatory motive is involved, an overwhelming majority of the re-
spondents-89%-erroneously believe that the law forbids such a dis-
will employee. As discussed above, even an at-will employee is legally protected against
certain wrongfully motivated discharges. See supra note 9.
26 Verkerke, supra note 2, at 873.
27 See supra note 4; see also Peter Stone Partee, Note, Reversing the Presumption of Employ-
ment At Will, 44 VAND. L. REv. 689, 705 (1991) (asserting that "employers may convey a less-
than-accurate image of job security"); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816, 1831 (1980)
[hereinafter Note, Protecting At Will Employees] (same).
28 See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 4, at 674.
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charge. Such a significant level of misconception is not limited to this
particular example. Grouping together six key questions testing re-
spondents' understanding of the at-will rule reveals that less than 10%
of them could answer more than half of these questions correctly.
The results similarly indicate that workers are misinformed about the
legal effect of employer statements regarding job security. In short,
this study raises serious doubts about whether workers have the most
basic information necessary for understanding the terms on which
they have contracted.
Before describing the study in more detail, I first explore, in Part
I, the current academic debate surrounding the efficiency of the at-
will rule. In Part II, I consider the handful of empirical studies which
bear on the issue of worker information, and those studies' limitations
in answering the precise issues of concern here-the level of workers'
knowledge of the at-will rule and their ability to gather accurate infor-
mation about prospective employers. Part III describes the survey de-
sign and the rationale behind it, while Part IV reports and interprets
the results. Finally, in Part V, I consider the implications of a finding
that workers systematically misunderstand the governing legal rules
for the on-going debate over the wisdom of the at-will rule.
I
THE DEBATE OVER THE EFFICIENCY OF THE AT-WILL RULE
In 1984, Richard Epstein offered his classic defense of employ-
ment at will, arguing that the common-law rule is justified on grounds
of both fairness and utility.29 Epstein's fairness argument focuses on
"the importance of freedom of contract as an end in itself... [as] an
aspect of individual liberty. '8 0 Epstein contends that because the at-
will rule merely provides a default presumption, it permits the parties,
acting in their own best interests, to arrive at the most efficient ar-
rangement for structuring their relationship.3 ' Moreover, he argues,
the at-will arrangement is the appropriate default because it in fact
represents an efficient solution to the contracting problems inherent
in any employment relationship.32
One possible response to Epstein's argument is to question his
normative starting point by asserting that other values besides effi-
ciency matter, or that true human flourishing demands a richer no-
tion of autonomy than mere free-market contracting. Indeed,
concerns of fairness, not efficiency, have motivated much of the criti-
cism of the at-will rule. Nevertheless, some critics of the at-will rule
29 Epstein, supra note 1.
30 I& at 953.
31 Id. at 951, 956-57.
32 Id.
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have engaged Epstein on his own ground, finding fault with his argu-
ments within the framework of a market analysis.3 3 Although fairness
concerns undoubtedly deserve a central role in any policy debate, this
Part focuses solely on the efficiency arguments for and against the at-
will rule.
Epstein's efficiency argument begins with the premise that a de-
fault rule should be chosen "because it reflects the dominant practice
in a given class of cases and because that practice is itself regarded as
making good sense for the standard transactions it governs. '3 4 In his
view, at-will employment meets both these criteria. He points out that
the at-will contract is the predominant form of employment relation-
ship in all trades and professions.3 5 Given this fact, any other rule of
construction would require the parties to contract around the default
in a large number of cases, unnecessarily increasing the costs of reach-
ing agreement.8 6
Moreover, Epstein argues, at-will arrangements in fact work to the
mutual benefit of both employer and employee by offering a low cost
mechanism for limiting abuses on both sides-the threat of firing
curbs employee malfeasance and shirking, while the threat of quitting
deters employer abuse of power.37 Epstein argues that although the
at-will rule imposes no legal sanction on the employer who acts arbi-
trarily, reputational effects will put the abusive employer at a competi-
tive disadvantage.38 The employer who exercises its right to terminate
for no reason or a bad reason not only incurs the costs of recruiting
and training a replacement worker, but also risks raising its overall
labor costs as its remaining employees, observing their employer's ar-
bitrary actions, value their own compensation package less highly and
perhaps begin to look elsewhere. 9
According to Epstein, a further strength of the at-will contract is
the manner in which it accommodates the uncertainties inherent in
33 See infa at 116-19.
34 Epstein, supra note 1, at 951.
35 Id at 956.
36 See id at 952.
87 IM at 965-67.
38 Id. at 967-68.
89 See id at 968. Of course, the notion that the threat of quitting is an effective deter-
rent of employer abuse is hardly uncontroversial. Much of the criticism of the at-will rule
stems from the contrary belief that employers and employees do not stand on an equal
footing, with the employer's power to discharge constituting a significantly more potent
threat than an employee's right to quit. The employee may be particularly vulnerable to
employer opportunism after accumulating seniority and its attendant benefits over many
years of service with a single employer. See, e.g., WFiLER, supra note 21, at 63-66. Even
Epstein acknowledges "that the contract at will works only where performance on both
sides takes place in lockstep progression." Epstein, supra note 1, at 979. Schwab, however,
suggests that asymmetric investments and the potential for opportunism often characterize
the career employment relationship. Schwab, supra note 6, at 10-11, 13-14.
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any employment relationship,40 Because the parties do not know at
the outset whether the match between job and worker is a good one,
the at-will contract accommodates this unknown in a sensible way, "al-
low[ing] both sides to take a wait-and-see attitude to their relationship
so that new and more accurate choices can be made on the strength
of improved information."'41 In addition, the at-will rule offers the ad-
vantage of very low administrative costs. Any departure from at-will
employment will entail substantial litigation with all of its attendant
costs, including the risk of erroneous verdicts. 42
Epstein implicitly assumes that the parties would not voluntarily
enter into a contract unless the agreement worked to their mutual
benefit. Thus, his assertion that the at-will contract is efficient rests in
part on its prevalence: "[i]t is simply incredible to postulate that
either employers or employees, motivated as they are by self-interest,
would enter routinely into a transaction that leaves them worse off
than they were before, or even worse off than their next best
alternative." 43
By emphasizing the role of informal norms, as distinct from law,
Rock and Wachter propose an alternative explanation for the effi-
ciency of a legal rule of employment at will.44 They argue that infor-
mal norms provide employees with a significantly greater degree of
job security than is apparent from the legal rule alone. Drawing on
the extensive literature on internal labor markets (ILMs)-the infor-
mal rules and practices governing a firm's internal relationships with
its employees-they argue that a clear norm forbids firing an em-
ployee without cause, despite the employee's formal at-will status.45
This apparent anomaly-the combination of a legal rule permitting
discharge without cause and a strong norm requiring just cause-rep-
40 Epstein, supra note 1, at 969.
41 Id. at 969. According to Epstein, the at-will contract benefits the employee who "is
not locked into an unfortunate contract if he finds better opportunities elsewhere or if he
detects some weakness in the internal structure of the firm." Id. His argument assumes
that the alternative to the at-will contract is a fixed term contract that would equally bind
employee and employer for a term of years. This assumption is puzzling because under
current law, courts do not require mutuality of obligation in employment contracts. See
generallyJosEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJiYANNAmIS BENDER, 2 CORBIN ON CONTRACrs § 6.2
(rev. ed. 1995) (discussing mutuality of obligation in the employment setting). Nonethe-
less, by making this assumption, Epstein fails to consider why a rational employee faced
with uncertainty would not prefer a just-cause contract with no corresponding restriction
on the right to quit. Many critics of the at-will rule propose just such an arrangement. See
supra note 13.
42 See Epstein, supra note 1, at 970.
43 Id. at 956-57.
44 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment
Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913 (1996).
45 Id. at 1917.
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resents a rational response to a set of strategic problems that beset any
long-term employment relationship.46
As Rock and Wachter explain, both employers and employees
make specific investments in their relationship in the form of training
and the acquisition of firm-specific skills, generating surpluses to the
benefit of both parties. 47 In order to ensure that both parties make
such investments, however, some mechanism is needed to constrain
overreaching by either side.48 By curbing abuses, the norms of the
ILM encourage the optimal level of investment in the relationship on
both sides.49 These norms are effective because each side is likely to
abide by them voluntarily in order to encourage ajoint investment in
the relationship by the other side.50 Moreover, the norms are self-
enforcing because either party can sanction the other for any viola-
tions.5 1 The possibility of discharge provides the employer with an
effective sanction against employee shirking, and, according to Rock
and Wachter, the threat of work slowdowns or unionization, as well as
"reputational effects," are sufficient to curb employer abuses.52 They
46 See id at 1921-22.
47 Id. at 1922-23.
48 See id at 1923. The possibility of overreaching exists because of the presence of
three factors in an ongoing employment relationship: "(1) match-specific investments, (2)
asymmetric information, and (3) transaction costs." Id
49 For example, one typical ILM norm requires firms to reduce employment, rather
than wages, in response to a reduction in demand for their product. Because the firm, but
not the worker, has accurate information about market conditions, an employer who could
unilaterally lower wages could take advantage of its workers and increase its profits. If,
however, the firm's only option in the face of declining demand is to reduce employment
and hence, output, it is less likely to exploit its informational advantage at the expense of
its workers. See id. at 1925-26.
Typical ILM norms include:
wages increase with seniority; a business downturn results in employee lay-
offs rather than wage reductions; if layoffs occur, junior workers lose their
jobs before senior workers; discharges are for cause; if an employer catches
an employee shirking, the employer will discharge the employee rather
than reduce his wages; and if firms discharge older workers before younger
workers, they do so through voluntary retirement mechanisms.
Id. at 1921.
50 See id. at 1930.
51 See id at 1930-31.
52 Id. Rock and Wachter argue that "[f]or the repeat player, departure from the
norm will impose costs on the employer- in hiring new employees, in discouraging work-
ers from making investments in match, in 'loss of morale' among existing employees...
and in higher wages." Id at 1931. They acknowledge that ILM norms are less likely to be
effective when the employer is going out of business and the threat of future sanctions no
longer has bite. Id. at 1932.
However, the efficacy of "reputational effects" in curbing employer abuses, even when
dealing with an on-going concern, is not at all certain. See Schwab, supra note 6, at 27.
Whether employer violations of ILM norms can be effectively sanctioned depends heavily
on the characteristics of the employment relationship. Generally, informal norms are ef-
fective in governing relations without legal intervention in the context of a close-knit
group-one where "informal power is broadly distributed among group members and the
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argue that because "the parties have incentives to abide by the norms,
without third party enforcement,"53 these norms do not require legal
enforcement in order to be effective.
From this perspective, the failure to include the ILM norm re-
quiring just cause for discharge in individual employment contracts
should not be seen as a "gap" to be filled by the courts. Instead, si-
lence on the issue of job security reflects the parties' recognition of
the costs involved in third-party enforcement,54 and a decision to
"precommit" not to invoke outside authority.55 Because the effective-
ness of these norms is premised on their self-enforcing nature, Rock
and Wachter argue that legal enforcement of ILM norms will likely
render the relationship less efficient rather than more so.56 Thus,
they conclude that courts should not enforce the informal norms of
ILMs, such as a requirement of just cause for termination, when the
parties themselves have not expressly made them a part of their
contract.57
Despite their differences, Rock and Wachter's defense of the at-
will rule closely parallels Epstein's. Their arguments share a similar
structure: an at-will relationship, or lack of enforceability of ILM
norms, must be what the parties want because they did not bargain for
any other arrangement.58 Just as Epstein argues that the prevalence
of at-will contracts reflects the parties' choice of a substantive rule gov-
erning termination of their relationship, Rock and Wachter assume
that at-will contracts reflect the parties' choice of an enforcement
mechanism. 59
For its defenders, the prevalence of the at-will rule in the real
world weighs heavily in their conclusion that it represents an efficient
arrangement. As Freed and Polsby put it, the simplest explanation for
the prevalence of the at-will contract across businesses, regions, and
circumstances is that it represents "the 'efficient' solution as between
information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among them." ROBERT C. Er,
LICKSON, ORDER Wrrour LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTL= DIsPUTES 177-78 (1991). Despite
Rock and Wachter's claim that the nonunion ILM is a close-knit group, Rock & Wachter,
supra note 44, at 1942, it is doubtful that the typical firm, especially a large national or
multinational corporation, shares these characteristics.
53 Rock & Wachter, supra note 44, at 1927.
54 See i& at 1932.
55 See id. at 1941.
56 Id. at 1949.
57 Id. at 1917.
58 The language of "choice" permeates Rock and Wachter's analysis: "legal interven-
tion is likely to be... inconsistent with the (ex ante) desires of the parties," id. at 1918; the
.parties precommit not to use third party enforcement," i& at 1941; "the choice between
norms and contract is the choice between self-enforcement and third party enforcement,"
id. at 1950.
59 In his taxonomy of rules, Ellickson labels the latter type of rule a "controller-select-
ing rule." ELucSoN, supra note 52, at 134.
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employers and employees. '60 After all, the common-law rule merely
establishes a default presumption; the parties remain free to contract
around it if they desire. That they rarely do so is taken as evidence
that at-will contracts not only are what employers and employees want,
but that they represent the most efficient arrangement as well.61
A number of critics assail this conclusion, challenging the as-
sumption that market outcomes necessarily reflect an efficient re-
sult.62 In their view, the nearly total absence ofjob-security guarantees
in the nonunion sector does not so much reflect the desires of the
parties as it evidences systematic market failure. Pointing to the preva-
lence ofjust-cause provisions in collectively bargained agreements, the
critics argue that nonunion workers are unlikely to have such vastly
different preferences from their union counterparts that they would
neither desire, nor be willing to pay for, ajob security guarantee. 63 In
diagnosing this market failure, they identify the following likely de-
fects in the bargaining process that lead to the underproduction of
just-cause guarantees: imperfect information, employees' inaccurate
assessments of risk, employers' misperceptions of cost, signaling
problems, and the "public good" nature of guarantees of job
security.64
Imperfect Information. One possible explanation for the failure of
individual employment contracts to provide forjob security is that em-
ployees go into the job search process with inadequate information. A
number of commentators suggest that employees misapprehend the
degree ofjob security that legal rules afford.65 If workers erroneously
believe that the law already protects them from unjust discharge, they
60 Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1098.
61 See Epstein, supra note 1, at 951; Verkerke, supra note 2, at 874-75.
62 E.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 6, at 1647-52; Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 1794-95;
Kamiat, supra note 21, at 1957; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1055; Willbom, supra note 4.
63 E.g., WEILER, supra note 21, at 72-73; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 6, at 1651-52; Kamiat,
supra note 21, at 1967-68.
64 I do not include in this list of potential "market failures" the common charge that
at-will terms result from inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee.
Because workers need jobs and jobs are scarce, they are forced to accept employment on
terms dictated by the employer. This argument is unlikely to move market advocates, who
would find a market failure justifying intervention only in situations of monopoly. Their
response to the complaint that "rich employers [can] outbid employees for terms of em-
ployment, such as the tenure property, that are valuable to them" is that such an outcome
"demonstrates not market failure but market success. A market is successful when it moves
resources from lower-value to higher-value uses." Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1100.
In this sense, the concern raised by inequality of bargaining power is not so much an
allegation of market failure, as an argument based on fairness. These fairness concerns are
important to any policy debate, and indeed underlie much of the existing protective labor
legislation. For example, the National Labor Relations Act is expressly premised on a find-
ing of inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees. 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1994).
65 See sources cited supra note 4.
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will not seek guarantees of job security from their employer. More-
over, even if they correctly understand the legal rules, they may be
unable to assess accurately a prospective employer's personnel poli-
cies,66 or to obtain meaningful information as to the actual risk of
dismissal they might face with a given firm.67 Any of these informa-
tion failures is likely to render employees unable to bargain meaning-
fully over the issue of job security.
Of course, employer and employee rarely negotiate individual
employment contracts in a formal sense. Outside of the collective bar-
gaining context, employer and employee do not sit down face to face
and dicker over a long list of employment terms and conditions.
Rather, bargaining supposedly takes place implicitly: by offering vary-
ing compensation packages, employers compete with one another to
attract the best employees. 68 Under this model, if employees valuejob
security, they would accept lower wages, or some other reduction in
benefits, in order to obtain the desired term. Once again, however,
the efficiency of implicit bargaining rests on the assumption that em-
ployees have the information necessary to make meaningful compari-
sons of the compensation packages offered by different employers
regarding the issue ofjob security. Thus, the possibility of widespread
information failure undermines confidence in the efficiency of the
contracting process, whether bargaining occurs explicitly or
implicitly.69
Employees' inaccurate assessment of risk. Even if workers have accu-
rate information, they may be unable to rationally process the infor-
mation they do have about the risk of discharge. Some hypothesize
that the natural psychological tendency to discount the likelihood of
low-probability bad events leads employees to undervalue just-cause
protections.70 The tendency to underestimate not only the likeli-
hood, but also the costs of job loss, exacerbates this undervaluation.
Although temporary wage loss might adequately measure the costs of
termination early in one's career, the same is not true for late-career
discharges. Typically, wages, benefits, and opportunities within a firm
66 Commentators suggest that this might occur because some workers cannot process
the information they receive, see Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1055, or because an employer
encourages an employee's false impression ofjob security. See Note, Protecting At Will Em-
ployees, supra note 27, at 1831.
67 See WEiLER, supra note 21, at 74; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 27, at
1831.
68 See Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1098-99 n.1; Verkerke, supra note 2, at 873.
69 Although the presence of imperfect information alone is not necessarily proof of
market failure, see, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 23, the greater the proportion of
uninformed market participants, the less likely it is that the market as a whole will behave
competitively. I explore this issue more fully in Part V below.
70 See WEiLER, supra note 21, at 74; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1055; Willborn, supra
note 4, at 128; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 27, at 1831.
1997]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
all increase with seniority, such that the loss of one's job after many
years of service entails far more than a mere loss of wages. 71 More-
over, "endowment effects"-the tendency of individuals to value what
they have more than identical things they might obtain-suggest that
workers will value their own jobs more highly than any calculation of
their tangible benefits might suggest.72 These effects are com-
pounded by the social significance attached to one's job in this soci-
ety,73 and likely result in employees seriously underestimating, when
initially entering an employment relationship, the consequences of a
job loss years down the road.
Employers' misperceptions of costs. Some commentators suggest that a
similar misperception of risk mars decisionmaking on the employer's
side as well. While employees underestimate the risks and costs of
suffering an unjust dismissal, employers likely overestimate the costs
of wrongful-discharge litigation.7 4 Moreover, employers may fail to
recognize the benefits of offering just-cause protections. Greater em-
ployee loyalty, together with improved hiring and supervisory prac-
tices, might prove more profitable in the long run than relying on the
threat of discharge.75
Signaling Problems. Informational asymmetries inherent in the
employment contracting process may create signaling problems which
further interfere with efficient bargaining over the issue of job secur-
ity.7 6 When entering an employment contract, employees know about
the future quality of their work and their likelihood of shirking, and
employers know whether they intend to abide by basic fairness norms
in handling future discipline and termination. In the absence of a
means to verify the claims of the other side, however, neither side is
likely to raise the issue of job security. On the one hand, the em-
ployee is unlikely to express a desire for just-cause protection, out of
fear that the employer will perceive her as a shirker.77 On the other
71 See WEILER, supra note 21, at 63-66; Schwab, supra note 6, at 25.
72 See Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 1801-02.
73 See id. at 1802-03; WEILER, supra note 21, at 64.
74 See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongful Discharge, 26 L. & Soc'y REv. 47 (1992).
75 See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 4, at 676-77.
76 See Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 1794-95; Kamiat, supra note 21, at 1957-60; David I.
Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection, 9 J. LAB. ECON.
294 (1991).
77 As Kamiat explains:
A relatively risk averse individual who desires long-term employment may
seek just-cause protection as a form of insurance against future employer
opportunism..., may be willing to pay a reasonable price for this insurance
(in terms of a wage adjustment reflecting the added costs), and may never-
theless be at least equally likely to perform work of outstanding quality.
Kamiat, supra note 21, at 1958. The difficulty for the employee in signaling to the em-
ployer the desire for such just-cause protection is that the employer will be unable to distin-
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hand, the employer will hesitate to announce its willingness to offer a
just-cause term in exchange for a wage discount, fearing that it will
attract a greater proportion of employees who are likely to shirk.78
Public Goods. Other critics theorize that just-cause provisions are
underproduced in individual employment contracts because such
provisions are "public goods. ' 79 They argue that just-cause protec-
tions are collective in nature because once an employer creates the
administrative and adjudicatory mechanisms necessary to support
such a term, it would likely be extended to all its employees.8 0 While
the benefit to employees collectively might well exceed the costs of
instituting such protections on a firm-wide basis, individual employees
will have an incentive to understate the value they place on a just-
cause term in order to position themselves as free riders.81 Thus, the
combination of strategic behavior and informational barriers will
likely result in the underproduction of contractual guarantees of job
security for nonunion employees.
Defenders of the at-will rule respond to these allegations of mar-
ket failure by further elaborating their theories on the efficient opera-
tion of the labor market with respect to job-security terms. Rejecting
the possibilities of market failure that critics of the at-will rule raise,
they argue that the number of unjust discharges in the nonunion sec-
tor has been exaggerated;8 2 that employees are able to learn about the
risks of dismissal through experience;8 3 that employees are as likely to
overestimate as to underestimate the risk of unjust dismissal;8 4 that
employers are unlikely to misperceive their own best interests in moni-
toring their agents;8 5 that the effects of signaling problems on con-
tracting for just-cause provisions are ambiguous;8 6 and that just-cause
provisions do not necessarily have the properties of a "public good. 87
To a considerable extent then, the debate over the at-will rule, at
least on efficiency grounds, comes down to which of these competing
theories most accurately captures what is actually happening in the
labor market.
guish her from the individual who values just-cause protection "precisely because she
expects (or wishes to reserve an option) to perform deficiently at the job ... tak[ing]
advantage of the costs that ajust-cause clause would impose on employer efforts to police
against shirking." I&
78 See id. at 1959.
79 WEiLmR, supra note 21, at 75; Kamiat, supra note 21, at 1967; Douglas L. Leslie, Labor
Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REv. 353, 356 (1984).
80 See, e.g., WhlLER, supra note 21, at 75.
81 See, e.g., id.
82 See Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1106-07; Morriss, supra note 2, at 1905-14.
83 See Morriss, supra note 2, at 1930; Verkerke, supra note 2, at 887.
84 See Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1105; Verkerke, supra note 2, at 898-900.
85 See Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1130-31.
86 See Verkerke, supra note 2, at 902-05.
87 Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1113-18.
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II
THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING EMPImCAL EVIDENCE OF
WORKERS' LEGAL KNOWLEDGE
Only a handful of studies offer any empirical data intended to
shed light on the debate over the at-will rule.88 Although each study
offers some useful information, none adequately tests the precise is-
sues that are the focus of this study: the extent to which employees
understand the background legal rules governing the employment re-
lationship and are able to acquire information regarding the termina-
tion policies and practices of prospective employers.
In one study, Verkerke surveyed employers in five states, inquir-
ing whether and how often they contracted with their nonunion em-
ployees for guarantees of job security.89 He reports that 52% of the
employers who responded to the survey contracted explicitly for an at-
will relationship, while 33% failed to specify any terms governing dis-
charge.90 Only 15% of the employers he surveyed expressly agreed to
discharge their employees only for just cause. 91 As he acknowledges,
these data do not reveal anything about the knowledge or beliefs of
individual employees. 92 Nevertheless, Verkerke argues that the con-
tracting practices he documents provide evidence of the contract
terms that both employers and employees prefer.93 Based on his find-
ing that an overwhelming majority of employers contracted for at-will
employment either expressly or implicitly by remaining silent in the
face of the default rule, he asserts that strong support exists for the
current default rule of employment at will. 94
Verkerke's move to bring empirical evidence to bear on what has
been a highly theoretical debate should be applauded; however, the
conclusions he reaches are vastly overdrawn. The first difficulty arises
from the manner in which he interprets his data. Verkerke collected
information about employer contracting practices by means of tele-
phone interviews in which employers in Virginia, California, Texas,
Michigan, and New York95 were asked about the types of documents
distributed to employees and what statements, if any, these documents
88 See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employment at Will: The Relationship Between Societal
Expectations and the Law, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 455 (1990); Frank S. Forbes & Ida M. Jones, A
Comparative, Attitudinal, and Analytical Study of Dismissal of At-Will Employees Without Cause; 37
L&B. L.J. 157 (1986); Verkerke, supra note 2.
89 Verkerke, supra note 2, at 865-69.
90 Id. at 867.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 900 ("[M]y survey data do not reveal the knowledge and beliefs of individual
employees.").
93 Id. at 842.
94 Id. at 875.
95 Id. at 865.
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made about employee discharges.96 The statements contained in re-
spondents' employment documents were classified into one of three
types: "you have the legal right to discharge employees for any reason
or no reason at any time," "you may discharge employees only for rea-
sons of poor or faulty performance of their duties, or... employees
may only be discharged for specific reasons listed," or "employees are
hired on fixed term contracts. '97
A significant difficulty arises, however, in interpreting the em-
ployer practices thus documented. As Verkerke admits, "the legal
rules governing the enforceability of such statements differ widely by
state."98 For example, Virginia courts require a signed writing-com-
pliance with the Statute of Frauds-before they will enforce an em-
ployer's promises to discharge only for cause,99 while New York courts
demand not only specific language, but proof of reliance as well.'00
California courts, on the other hand, liberally enforce even general
promises ofjob security.'01 Despite the considerable state by state va-
riation he documents in the legal consequences of employer state-
ments regarding discharge, 10 2 Verkerke makes the remarkable
assumption that "if a respondent reported that a document required
specifically enumerated reasons or established a general good cause
requirement for discharge, then that employer intended to provide
legally enforceable just cause protection."' 0 3 By glossing over factual
and jurisdictional variations which affect the legal consequences of
employer statements regarding discharge, Verkerke likely has overesti-
96 M app. at 916. Apparently, the survey also asked respondents questions about oral
statements made to employees regarding discharge, but Verkerke concludes that these re-
sponses were not sufficiently reliable to warrant reporting and analysis. I at 867.
97 Id app. at 916. Verkerke apparently relied on respondents to classify the statements
contained in their employment documents. Id.
98 Id. at 866-67.
99 See Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols, 421 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Va. 1992).
100 See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 921, 923 (N.Y. 1987); Weiner v.
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y. 1982).
101 See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 388 (Cal. 1988) (stating that
the acts and conduct of the parties, including the employer's written termination guide-
lines, may give rise to an implied contract limiting its power to discharge at will).
102 Verkerke expends considerable energy in the early part of his article disputing
Schwab's "life cycle hypothesis," see Schwab, supra note 6, at 11, arguing that "systematic
jurisdictional variation, combined with careful judicial attention to the problem of inter-
preting arguably contractual writings," better explain current case law. Verkerke, supra
note 2, at 852. Ironically, he abandons this emphasis when interpreting his own data.
103 Verkerke, supra note 2, at 867. In other words, once an employer reports that its
employee handbook lists the specific reasons for discharge, its employees are assumed to
be protected by ajust-cause contract, regardless of the context and circumstances in which
the statement is made and regardless of whether the employer is located in New York,
where the courts "have rarely seen a handbook provision that they were willing to enforce,"
id. at 847, or California, where the courts "do not appear to have seen an employee hand-
book provision discussing discharge that they were not willing to enforce," id.
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mated significantly the number of employers in his sample that ex-
pressly contract with employees for just-cause protection.
A more serious problem with Verkerke's analysis is the normative
conclusion he derives from his data. Following the standard eco-
nomic theory of default rules, he argues that the default for employ-
ment contracts should be the term that most employers and
employees prefer, in order to minimize the costs of explicit bargain-
ing over the issue of job security. Claiming that his survey data pro-
vide "the best available evidence of parties' preferences," Verkerke
concludes that they "strongly support the prevailing default rule of
employment at will."14
Verkerke's empirical data may be the best available evidence on
the actual contracting practices of employers. However, his claim that
they reveal the true preferences of employers and employees on the
issue ofjob security is unsupported. Market outcomes may reflect the
parties' preferences when the market is working efficiently, but whether
the market for job security is efficient-or is characterized instead by
systematic market failure-is precisely the point that is controversial.
If anything, Verkerke's findings tend to confirm what both sides in the
debate have assumed all along-that employment at will is the domi-
nant form of contract in actual practice. Where the two sides differ is
in how they interpret that fact. Unfortunately, Verkerke's data offer
no help in resolving this dispute. By simply concluding that the con-
tracting practices of employers transparently reflect the parties' pref-
erences,10 5 Verkerke falls back on the same controversial assumptions
about the efficiency of the labor market on which Epstein and other
defenders of the at-will rule rely. 0 6
104 Id, at 897. I argue above that Verkerke's methodology likely has overestimated the
number of employers that have contracted with employees for just-cause protections. An
upward adjustment in the proportion of at-will contracts might seem at first glance to
strengthen his argument that the at-will rule is a good one; however, his normative conclu-
sion is vulnerable not so much because of his numbers, but because of his unfounded
assumption that the observed market outcome is the result of an efficient bargaining
process.
105 Verkerke's own observations raise doubts as to whether the employer practices he
documents accurately reflect even the desires of employers as to the legal relationships
they are creating, let alone the preferences of employees. I&. at 867 n.127 ("[T]he inter-
view reports seem to suggest that employers offering just cause protection are no better
informed about these highly technical aspects of the law than one might expect the aver-
age employee would be."); id at 874 n.153 ("Interview reports suggest that a nontrivial
number of employers do not know the law."); id. at 901 n.222 ("Interview notes from the
survey confirm that a significant proportion of employers are woefully ignorant about the
legal consequences of their employment practices.").
106 Only after he concludes that at-will employment is the appropriate default rule
does Verkerke turn to consideration of the various market failure theories posited by critics
of the rule. Id. at 886-89, 897-912. At this point, his discussion takes on the quality of
theoretical speculation, which he decries elsewhere. For example, in discussing the critics'
claim that workers have a psychological tendency to underestimate the value of just-cause
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In considering the question that is the focus of this study-
whether workers understand the legal iules governing the employ-
ment relationship-Verkerke admits that his survey data do not pro-
vide direct evidence on this issue.'0 7 Nevertheless, he suggests that
they provide an indirect test of the competing theories regarding em-
ployees' legal knowledge.' 08 According to Verkerke, if information
problems in fact cause workers to fail to bargain for just-cause protec-
tion, then legally well-informed employees should contract for just-
cause at a higher rate than uninformed employees.' 0 9 Hypothesizing
that employees are unlikely to be equally uninformed across indus-
tries and occupations, he posits that one might expect to see varia-
tions by industry and occupation in the levels of just-cause
protection. 11° Finding no such variations in his survey data, he con-
cludes that they provide no support for the critics' claim that workers
lack accurate information about their legal rights."'
While Verkerke may be correct that his data do not support the
critics' theory of informational failure, neither do they disprove it.
Even if his hypothesis that the level of legal knowledge varies systemat-
protection, Verkerke argues that "other equally plausible speculations" suggest a different
conclusion. Id. at 899. He theorizes that because workers likely overestimate their own job
performance and underestimate the costs of enforcement, they are therefore as likely to
overvalue as to undervalue just-cause protection. Id. at 899-900. Verkerke's responses to
the other allegations of market failure have a similar flavor. He rejects the critics' sugges-
tion that employers may overestimate the costs of providing just-cause protection by theo-
rizing that it is "equally likely that employers who are ill-informed about the law and its
consequences will dramatically underestimate the legal risks to which they expose them-
selves when they agree to offer just cause protection." Id. at 901. Similarly, Verkerke sug-
gests that the signaling problems that arise from informational asymmetries might as
plausibly discourage employers from seeking an at-will relationship as they would discour-
age employees from seeking just-cause protection. Id. at 903.
107 Id. at 900. Verkerke speculates that "[e ]mployees might equally well underestimate
the extent of legal protection they have against discharge," citing data that a very small
proportion of employees who believe they have suffered sex or race discrimination actually
sue their employers. Id. at 887 (citing David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litiga-
tion, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983)). The study by Trubek et al., however, offers no informa-
tion at all about the level of employees' legal knowledge. Rather, its purpose was to study
the resources expended on processing disputes through litigation. Trubek et al., supra, at
75. As its analysis suggests, a host of factors having nothing to do with employee percep-
tions of legal protections-factors such as cost, access to legal counsel, and the assessment
of likely outcomes-may influence the proportion of litigated disputes.
108 Verkerke, supra note 2, at 888.
109 Id. Elsewhere, Verkerke argues that workers who have experienced discharge
would be expected to demand and receive just-cause protection. Id. at 900. Such a result,
however, depends upon at least two assumptions: first, that discharged workers are in fact
able to assess more accurately their future risks ofjob loss as a result of their experience;
and second, that no other market failures, such as signaling problems, interfere with these
workers' ability to bargain for increased job security. As discussed in Part IV below, the
results of this study cast serious doubt on the first assumption. Neither Verkerke's data set
nor my own helps to empirically assess the second assumption.
110 Id. at 888, 900.
111 Id. at 900.
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ically by industry or occupation were proven, a corresponding varia-
tion in the level ofjust-cause protection would be observed only if the
other market failures posited by critics of the at-will rule do not in fact
exist. Thus, Verkerke's observation that employees of varying occupa-
tions at all levels of a firm typically work under identical contractual
terms governing discharge n1 2 does not so much undermine the theory
of information failure as it suggests that just-cause provisions have the
characteristics of a public good. Ultimately, as Verkerke acknowl-
edges," 3 the theory that information failures interfere with bargain-
ing over job security is best tested by direct empirical evidence, rather
than further speculation. The study described in Parts III and IV of
this Article directly measures the legal knowledge of a group of work-
ers, providing far more accurate information about the existence of
informational failures than the inferential arguments Verkerke makes
based on his data.
Three other empirical studies explore more closely the issue of
employee beliefs and perceptions regarding job security. However,
for the reasons discussed below, these studies are of limited usefulness
in measuring the level of employee comprehension of legal protec-
tions against unjust discharge.
Two of the surveys focus on general societal attitudes towards an
employer's right to discharge an employee under certain circum-
stances."14 In a 1989 mailed survey in the Syracuse, New York, metro-
politan area, Callahan asked respondents whether a discharged
employee should prevail in a lawsuit against his or her employer in a
variety of situations involving employee opposition to illegal or unethi-
cal employer activities." 5 Similarly, Forbes and Jones asked respon-
dents in a 1983 telephone survey in Omaha, Nebraska, whether it is
ethical for an employer to terminate an employee without a good rea-
son and whether the respondent would support a legal requirement
of just-cause before an employer could terminate an employee." 6
112 Id. at 888-89.
11" Id. at 887 n.187.
114 See Callahan, supra note 88; Forbes &Jones, supra note 88.
115 Callahan, supra note 88, at 464-66, 470. The questionnaire described eight general
kinds of employee activity (e.g., refusing to participate in illegal activity, informing supe-
rior of another employee's job-related unethical practices) that led to discharge, and asked
respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the conclusion that the employee
should prevail in a lawsuit against the employer. See id. at 470, 471 tbl.III. It also presented
13 specific fact patterns, most based on reported cases, and again asked respondents
whether they believed the law should favor the employee or the employer. See id. at 472-73.
Callahan's purpose in conducting the survey was to document societal attitudes toward at-
will employment and possible legal protections for employees fired for opposing unlawful
or unethical employer activity. Id at 456. Ultimately, she concludes that the traditional at-
will rule is inconsistent with societal expectations to the extent that it insulates employers
from legal liability for such retaliatory discharges. Id. at 481.
116 Forbes &Jones, supra note 88, at 165.
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The results of these studies are consistent to the extent that both re-
port significant support for legal limitations on an employer's right to
discharge at wil.117 However, because these studies were concerned
primarily with discovering what respondents believed the law should
be, rather than testing their knowledge of what the law is, they shed
little light on the extent to which employees accurately understand
the meaning and application of the at-will default rule to individual
employment contracts.118
A study conducted by Schmedemann and Parks does purport to
test directly the accuracy of public perceptions regarding certain em-
ployment rights.119 As part of a larger survey assessing the legal and
moral obligations created by promissory language in employee hand-
books, they tested respondents' knowledge of the legal rights of em-
ployees to certain procedural protections in the event of
termination. 120 More specifically, they asked respondents to indicate
their agreement or disagreement with several statements regarding
employees' procedural rights in the event of termination, such as the
right to an explanation of the reasons for discharge, or the right to
have an upper-level manager review the discharge. 121 Based on the
responses, Schmedemann and Parks conclude that the respondents'
perceptions of the law-at least as to these procedural protections-
are "fundamentally accurate.' 22 .
Because of the population surveyed and the nature of the ques-
tions, the findings of Schmedemann and Parks provide only limited
assistance in assessing the theory that employee misperceptions of
their legal rights lead to a failure to bargain over job security. First,
the population surveyed-undergraduate and graduate business stu-
117 See Callahan, supra note 88, at 470-75; Forbes &Jones, supra note 88, at 165-66.
118 Forbes andJones apparently did ask respondents about their knowledge of the law
and reported that only a small percentage "knew that employers hold the right to termi-
nate at any time even without cause." Id. at 165. Unfortunately, they provide very little
information about their methodology. For example, the precise question posed to respon-
dents is not clear. In their article, they paraphrase the question as "does an employer have
the right to fire an employee without giving a reason?," id., suggesting a focus on procedural
requirements, but Forbes and Jones then report that very few respondents know that em-
ployers can terminate "without cause," id., a claim about the respondents' knowledge of
the substantive limits on an employer's right to discharge. In light of the clearly normative
cast of the other questions posed in the survey and the risk it creates of biasing responses
unintentionally, the form and manner in which the question relating to legal knowledge
was posed is particularly critical to obtaining accurate results. Given the lack of method-
ological detail, it is difficult to assess the reliability of their findings regarding respondents'
legal knowledge.
119 Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi McLean Parks, Contract Formation and Employee
Handbooks: Lega Psychological, and Empirical Analyses, 29 WArE FoRsr L. Rxv. 647, 650-51
(1994).
120 Id. at 653.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 656.
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dents and practicing lawyers-is not representative of most employ-
ees. 123 Members of this sample are not only far more educated than
the average employee, but their particular areas of study or training-
business and law-likely provide them far greater knowledge of the
relevant legal rules than the general population. Even more troub-
ling, the authors report that all of the respondents filled out the sur-
vey "as part of coursework on topics related to the study.'"124
Schmedemann and Parks give no further information about the con-
text in which the survey was administered, but the fact that the respon-
dents were engaged contemporaneously in coursework related to the
subject of the survey further decreases the likelihood that their per-
ceptions of the law are typical of the labor force.
Aside from these concerns about the population surveyed, a fur-
ther difficulty arises due to the nature of the questions posed.
Although Schmedemann and Parks designed this portion of their
study "to measure public awareness of th[e] law on discharge of em-
ployees,"' 25 all of their questions concerned the procedural rights of
employees in the event of termination. Thus, they prefaced their
questions concerning legal entitlements with an instruction to assume
that the employee "has been fired for performance reasons."' 26 With
this limiting instruction, they excluded from consideration the princi-
pal question of interest to the at-will debate: do employees understand
that the law offers them no generalized protection from arbitrary or
unjust discharge? After all, the at-will rule has been the subject of
controversy, not because of the lack of procedural protections for em-
ployees fired for performance reasons, but because of the possibility
that employers will fire workers for bad reasons or no reason at all.
Thus, even if they could generalize their finding that perceptions of
employees' procedural rights are quite accurate, their data tell us little
about the extent to which workers understand that the default rule-
employment at will-does not require their employer to have any rea-
son at all for terminating their employment.
III
THE SURVEY DESIGN: TESTING EMPLOYEES' LEGAL
KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION GATHERING
EXPERIENCES
This study focuses on two questions central to the debate over the
at-will rule. First, do employees understand the background legal
123 See id. at 650. The survey sample consisted of 51 graduate students, 169 undergrad-
uate students, and 46 lawyers. See id at n.25.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 653.
126 Id. at 693.
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rules governing the employment relationship? Second, are they able
to obtain accurate information about a prospective employer's poli-
cies and practices regarding dismissal?
Because of a peculiarity of the labor market, answering these
questions requires a focus on the knowledge of active job seekers,
rather than the workforce in general. Unlike the typical commodity,
labor is generally not traded on a "'spot market'-a daily auction in
which employers bid against each other for the services of prospective
employees."' 27 Rather, employment relationships tend to be long-
term, lasting months, years, or even an entire career. Most workers,
most of the time, are not "on the market," actively searching for alter-
native employment and comparing the compensation packages of-
fered by different employers. As a result, competitive wages and terms
tend to be defined at the margins, by the worker looking for a newjob
rather than by the typical long-term employee. 128 The efficiency of
the labor market in setting terms and conditions like job security thus
depends more upon the information available to active job seekers
than to average employees. 129
This study explored the adequacy of workers' information by
means of a written survey testing respondents' perceptions of their
legal rights, as well as asking about their prior experience gathering
information about a particular employer before accepting a job. I
chose a written survey instrument in order to eliminate potential bi-
ases that an interviewer might introduce unintentionally. Using a
written instrument also produced consistency in the form in which the
data was collected, thereby facilitating analysis. The principal disad-
vantage of the written survey was the limitation it imposed on the
length and complexity of the questions. Because I expected that the
population surveyed would include people from a broad range of edu-
cational backgrounds, I felt it was imperative to limit the number of
questions, to minimize the level of reading difficulty of each question,
and to avoid any branching instructions. Thus, the survey did not in-
clude any conditional questions to explore particular responses in
greater detail.
The survey was administered to several hundred unemployment
insurance claimants in St. Louis City and County during August, Sep-
tember, and October of 1996.130 I chose to survey unemployment in-
127 Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace,
100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2781 (1991).
128 See Samuel Issacharoff, ReconstructingaEmployment, 104 HALv. L. REv. 607, 621 (1990)
(reviewing W t R, supra note 21).
129 See WEILER, supra note 21, at 76.
130 Throughout most of this period of time, workers were on strike against McDonnell
Douglas, one of the largest employers in the St. Louis metropolitan area. Although they
were eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits, these workers were screened
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surance claimants for several reasons. First, in order to qualify for
state unemployment insurance benefits in Missouri, an individual
must have earned a certain minimum amount of wages over roughly
the prior 15 months. 3 1 Thus, all eligible unemployment insurance
claimants must have some level of experience with, and attachment to,
the labor market.'3 2 Second, continuing eligibility for unemployment
insurance benefits requires the claimant to undertake an active job
search.' 3 3 Because these individuals are job seekers, the survey cap-
tures their beliefs and attitudes close to the point in time most rele-
vant to this inquiry-the moment when they decide to accept or reject
ajob offer from a particular employer. Finally, the close similarity in
the structure of unemployment insurance systems nationwide offers
the possibility of studying roughly comparable populations in other
states at a future date.
Responses to the survey were collected at the six offices of the
Missouri Division of Employment Security, the state agency which ad-
ministers unemployment insurance benefits, that are located in St.
Louis City and County. During the time the survey was conducted,
out of the sample entirely in order to avoid skewing the results. The survey collected the
following demographic information about the respondents: sex (male - 53%, female -
47%); age (under 25 - 14%, 25-34 - 35%, 35-44 - 29%, 45-54 - 15%, 55-64 - 6%, 65
and over - 1%); race (White - 45.9%, Black - 50.5%, Asian/Pacific Islander - .3%,
Hispanic origin - 1.2%, Native American - .3%, other - 1.8%); education (no high
school diploma - 6%, high school diploma or equivalent - 39%, associate or technical
degree - 10%, some college, no degree - 32%, college degree - 7%, some graduate
school or graduate degree - 6%); and income (average annual earnings of last job was
less than $10,000 - 19%, $10,000 - $14,999 - 26%, $15,000 - $24,999 - 27%, $25,000 -
$49,999 - 23%, $50,000 - $74,999 - 4%, $75,000 and over - 1%).
131 Eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits is measured in reference to a "base
period" which is defined as "the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters."
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.030(2) (West Supp. 1997). An "insured worker" is one
who has been paid wages for insured work in the amount of one thousand
dollars or more in at least one calendar quarter of such worker's base pe-
riod and total wages in the worker's base period equal to at least one and
one-half times the insured wages in that calendar quarter of the base period
in which the worker's insured wages were the highest, or in the alternative,
a worker who has been paid wages in at least two calendar quarters of such
worker's base period and whose total base period wages are at least one and
one-half times the maximum taxable wage base, taxable to any one
employer.
Id § 288.030(22).
132 Of course, not every individual who files for unemployment insurance benefits will
be eligible to receive them. Due to the manner in which the data were collected, the
population this study surveyed consists of claimants as distinct from recipients of unemploy-
ment insurance benefits. The former group undoubtedly includes some individuals who
do not meet the basic eligibility requirements in terms of prior earnings. Nevertheless, all
claimants are likely to have some work experience, even if they fail to meet the minimum
statutory earnings requirement.
133 In order to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be "able to work" and "available
for work." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.040(2) (West Supp. 1997). "No person shall be deemed
available for work unless he has been and is actively and earnestly seeking work." Id.
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the Division of Employment Security required all unemployment in-
surance claimants to appear in person at a local office in order to file
an initial claim for benefits. Those filing an initial claim arrived with-
out an appointment and often needed to wait for some time before
meeting with a counselor. While waiting, they were asked if they
would be willing to complete the survey form. Although this ap-
proach did not guarantee a truly randomized sample of unemploy-
ment insurance claimants, 34 it had the advantage of producing a very
high response rate. Out of 398 persons approached, 337 agreed to
complete the survey, resulting in a nearly 85% response rate.
The survey itself was divided into four parts. Parts I and III con-
tained a series of questions intended to test the respondent's knowl-
edge of the legal rules governing the employment relationship. 3 5
Part II asked questions designed to discover the extent to which em-
ployees were able to learn information about a prospective employer's
policies regarding discharge or its general reputation for fairness
prior to hire. The remaining questions in Part II sought information
about the respondent's attitudes toward, and past experiences with,
employers that might influence his or her other responses. Finally,
Part IV of the survey asked for general demographic information
about the respondent.
The question of whether employees understand the basic legal
rules governing the employment relationship can be broken down
into three parts. First, do employees know that the default rule is "em-
ployment at will"? Second, do employees understand what it means to
be employed "at will"? In other words, can they correctly identify
whether a given reason for firing an employee is legally permissible
under the at-will rule? Third, do employees know under what circum-
stances the employment-at-will presumption is overcome?
The survey collapses the first two questions into a single line of
inquiry by describing a series of employee discharges, identifying the
reason for each discharge, and asking whether the discharge was law-
134 The number of surveys collected at each of the six offices was roughly proportional
to the number of claims filed at each office during the third quarter of the previous year.
Beyond this, no attempt was made to systematically select which individuals to survey. The
surveys were administered during two or three hour time blocks, usually in the mornings
or early afternoons early in the week when traffic in the offices was highest. In theory, the
results might therefore be biased in favor of individuals who file earlier in the week and
earlier in the day. It is difficult to imagine, however, how such a bias might influence the
results in any systematic way.
135 The two parts of the survey testing legal knowledge were separated in order to
provide some variation in the form of the questions from the perspective of the respon-
dent. I was also concerned that the questions in Part III-concerning the legal effect of
various employer statements contained in an employee handbook or offer letter-might
influence responses in Part II-which asks what types of information respondents had
about their prospective employer. Therefore, the second set of legal-knowledge questions
follows Part II.
1997]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ful or unlawful. In this form, the questions directly test the respon-
dents' beliefs as to whether they would be legally protected under the
circumstances described. This approach simplifies the form of the
questions by eliminating reference to a legal term of art-"at-will em-
ployment"-which might cause confusion or be interpreted differ-
ently by .different respondents. 3 6 Moreover, it did not seem
particularly important to find out whether employees can put the cor-
rect legal label on their relationship with their employers; what mat-
ters is whether they know when the law affords them legal protection
against discharge and when it does not.
Part I of the survey describes eight situations in which an em-
ployee is discharged and briefly describes the employer's motive for
the discharge.' 3 7 Because the prefatory instructions to this section
specifically rule out the existence of any contract, the employee in
each scenario is clearly employed at will. 138 In addition, the instruc-
tions rule out the possibility of any illegal discrimination based on
race, sex, national origin, religion, age or disability. Respondents are
then asked whether they believe the discharge to be lawful or unlaw-
ful. By varying the reason given for discharge while holding the em-
ployee's status (at-will) constant, the questions in Part I directly test
the respondents' perception of their legal protections in the absence
of any contractual agreement with the employer regarding job
security.
136 A further difficulty with separating the two issues is that questions directed toward
the second line of inquiry-what it means to be "at will"-would tend to suggest the cor-
rect response to the first line of inquiry-what is the nature of the relationship in the
absence of a contract specifying the duration of employment-thereby influencing the
results.
137 See infra Appendix A.
138 Under the traditional common-law rule, private-sector employees are employed at
will in the absence of any contract to the contrary. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying
text. However, a different set of rules apply to government employees. Constitutional due
process requirements apply when a government employee has an established property in-
terest in her job, see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and civil-service rules that
typically require cause for discharge cover many public-sector workers, see CHARLES A. SuL-
LIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 337 (1993). Thus, the analysis
that follows in the text applies to private-sector workers employed at will.
The questions in Part I generally refer to the employer as the "company," indicating
that the employment relationship described is in the private sector and hence not covered
by civil service rules. Admittedly, the survey would have been a sounder instrument if the
instructions or questions had explicitly made clear that the discharge described occurred
in the private sector. However, it is doubtful that this oversight significantly compromised
the results. Government employees-those most likely to interpret "the company" to
mean a public employer constrained by civil service rules-comprised only 8.6% of the
respondents. Excluding their responses, as well as those of respondents who did not iden-
tify the industry in which they had worked, does not significantly change the results. See
infra note 152.
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In Missouri, as elsewhere, an employee hired for an indefinite
term is presumed to be at-will,' 3 9 and, absent a contrary statutory pro-
hibition, may be fired without liability "for cause or without cause." 140
Although Missouri has declined to follow the more liberal jurisdic-
tions that recognize multiple exceptions to the at-will rule, 141 its
courts recognize a public policy exception permitting at-will employ-
ees to sue for wrongful discharge when their termination violates
some clear mandate of public policy.142 However, the exception is a
narrow one and applies only "when an employer's act of discharging
the employee is violative of a statute, regulation based on a statute, or
a constitutional provision."'143
The at-will rule merely states a default rule which the parties are
free to avoid by contract. The legally informed employee, therefore,
must understand not only the meaning of the at-will presumption, but
the circumstances under which it may be overcome as well. Part III of
the survey tests this aspect of legal knowledge by asking respondents
whether a discharge is lawful or unlawful in light of the employer's
written statements regarding job security.'4 In order to isolate the
effect of the employer's statements, I held the reason for discharge-
139 See Clark v. Beverly Enters.-Mo., Inc., 872 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
140 Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985).
141 Compare Mitford v. Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983) (recognizing "implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing" in employment contracts) and Merrill v. Crothall-
Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 101 (Del. 1992) (same) with Neighbors v. Kirksville College of
Osteopathic Med., 694 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a claim based
on implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment cannot circumvent
Missouri's at-will rule); compareToussaintv. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892
(Mich. 1980) (holding employer promises in employee handbook enforceable) and Wool-
ley v. Hoffinann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (NJ.), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J.
1985) (same) with Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662-63 (Mo.
1988) (rejecting "handbook exception" to at-will rule).
142 Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
143 Lynch v. Blanke Baer & Bowey Krimko, Inc., 901 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995). The leading case in Missouri on the issue spoke of "public policy" in broad terms.
Boy/e 700 S.W.2d at 871. In 1988, however, the Missouri Supreme Court in Johnson, 745
S.W.2d at 663, rejected an employee's claim based on the "public policy" exception. It
noted that "[l] n the cases cited by plaintiff the employee had the benefit of a constitutional
provision, a statute, or a regulation based on a statute. No statute, regulation based on a
statute, or constitutional provision is implicated here." Id. at 663 (citations omitted). Sub-
sequently, Missouri courts of appeals have interpreted Johnson not as overruling Boyle, but
as limiting the public policy exception to those situations that threaten violation of a spe-
cific statute, regulation based on statute, or constitutional provision. See, e.g., Yow v. Village
of Eolia, 859 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Mo. Ct App. 1993); Kirk v. Mercy Hosp. Tri-County, 851
S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo. Ct App. 1993); Luethans v. Washington Univ., 838 S.W.2d 117, 119-
20 (Mo. Ct App. 1992). Not every regulation, however, indicates a "clear mandate of pub-
lic policy." Adolphsen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Mo. Ct App. 1995).
General allegations of a violation of unspecified "safety regulations," id., or of a Code of
Ethics requiring the exercise of "bestjudgment," see, e.g., Lay v. St. Louis Helicopter Air-
ways, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), are too vague to support a claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
144 See infra Appendix A.
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the employer plans to hire another person to do the same job at a
lower wage-constant for each question in Part III and varied the de-
scription of the employer's statements regarding job security.
In Missouri, employees cannot easily defeat the at-will presump-
tion for an indefinite hiring. Missouri courts have consistently refused
to follow the expansive contract doctrines developed in other states
finding guarantees of job security in an employer's general policy
statements. 145 Instead, Missouri has hewed to the traditional require-
ments that an employee seeking to avoid her at-will status must plead
and prove "[t] he essential elements of valid contract... offer, accept-
ance, and bargained for consideration.' 46 Thus, an employer's uni-
lateral act of publishing an employee handbook does not constitute a
contractual offer and no promise ofjob security can be derived from
its provisions.147 Nor does an employee's quitting a previous job in
detrimental reliance on an employer's promise of employment give
rise to a claim of promissory estoppel.148 Indeed, a court has even
rejected a written contract with an express 'Just-cause" clause as insuf-
ficient to overcome the at-will presumption. 149 Given this judicial hos-
tility to indefinite term, just-cause contracts, it appears that in
Missouri, the at-will presumption can be overcome only by a clear
agreement of employment for a fixed term.
Given this legal backdrop, workers in Missouri have little protec-
tion against arbitrary discharge in the absence of a specific statutory
violation. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the circumstances of each dis-
charge described in Parts I and III of the survey, and indicate whether
the discharge is lawful under Missouri law. Only two of the reasons
for termination described in Part I-retaliation for reporting an em-
ployer's violations of fire regulations to a government agency (Part I,
Question 5) and retaliation for refusing to participate in illegal billing
practices (Part I, Question 8)-give rise to viable claims for wrongful
discharge. In the remaining six situations, an employee has no legal
protection against discharge. After the Missouri Supreme Court's
clear holding that the issuance of an employee handbook does not
constitute a contractual offer,150 employees cannot derive any legal
protection from informal employer statements regarding job security.
Thus, each of the terminations described in Part III is lawful.
145 See supra note 141.
146 Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 662.
147 Id.
148 Compare Rosatone v. GTE Sprint Communications, 761 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding employee's reliance on a promise of employment at will insufficient
to state a cause of action) with Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116
(Minn. 1981) (allowing recovery on promissory estoppel theory).
149 Main v. Skaggs Community Hosp., 812 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
150 Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663.
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Even assuming that employees understand the relevant legal
rules, their ability to bargain effectively over the issue--of job security
requires that they obtain accurate information about a prospective
employer's termination policies and practices. This is true whether
the "bargaining" occurs explicitly through direct negotiation over
terms, or implicitly by a process of employer competition to attract the
best employees by offering attractive packages of wages and benefits.
Part II of the survey addresses the extent to which employees are able
to gather information about a particular employer by asking respon-
dents about the sources of information they had about their last em-
ployer prior to accepting the job.15' Because of the limitations of the
survey format, it could not test more precisely the substance of the
information obtained or the influence, if any, it had on the worker's
decisionmaking process. More significantly, the survey format offered
no reliable way to test the accuracy of the information obtained.
Thus, the questions in Part II venture only an exploratory glimpse at
the sources of information about prospective employers available to
workers.
IV
THE REsuLTs: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTION OF
FULL INFORMATION
The survey data reveal a striking level of misunderstanding
among respondents of the most basic legal rules governing the em-
ployment relationship. In Part I, which asked whether certain speci-
fied reasons for discharging an at-will employee are lawful, the
average score was 51%; in other words, respondents gave correct re-
sponses barely half the time. Because each question had only two pos-
sible answers-lawful or unlawful-it appears at first glance that
respondents' ability to apply the at-will rule to specific factual situa-
tions was no better than if they were guessing randomly.
A closer look at the data, however, reveals more systematic errors
in the respondents' beliefs about the relevant legal rules. Table 1 re-
ports separately the responses given to each of the eight questions in
Part I. Examining the results for individual questions makes clear that
the errors are not randomly distributed, but result from respondents'
systematic overestimation of legal protection in certain circumstances.
For example, overwhelming majorities of the respondents erroneously
believed that an employer cannot legally fire an employee in order to
hire someone else at a lower wage (82.2%), for reporting internal
wrongdoing by another employee (79.2%), based on a mistaken belief
of the employee's own wrongdoing (87.2%), or out of personal dislike
'15 See infra Appendix B.
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TABLE 1
RESPONSES TO PART I OF SURVEY'
5 2
(N=337)
% of Total Responses
Legal Rule in
Missouri:
Reason for Discharge Lawful Unlawful No Response Discharge Is Error Rate
1. Employer plans to 17.8 82.2 0 Lawful 82.2
hire another person to
do same job at a lower
wage
2. Unsatisfactory job 92.0 7 .7 153 .3 Lawful 7.7
performance
3. Retaliation for report- 20.8 79.2 0 Lawful 79.2
ing theft by another em-
ployee to supervisor
4. Mistaken belief that 10.4 87.2 2.4 Lawful 87.2
employee stole money
(employee can prove
mistake)
5. Retaliation for report- 8.9 88.7 2.4 Unlawful 8.9
ing violation of fire reg-
ulations to government
agency
6. Lack of work 78.6 18.7 2.7 Lawful 18.7
7. Personal dislike of 8.0 89.0 3.0 Lawful 89.0
employee
8. Retaliation for refus- 10.4 87.2 2.4 Unlawful 10.4
ing to participate in ille-
gal billing practice
of the employee (89%). Comparison of error rates confirms this sys-
tematic bias. When the discharge described is in fact unlawful, the
average error rate is 9.6%; in contrast, the average error rate in identi-
152 As discussed above, supra note 138, one concern in interpreting these results is that
government employees might answer these questions based on their understanding of civil
service rules, rather than the legal rules operating in the private sector. Table IA reports
the results when the responses of government employees, as well as any respondents who
did not indicate the industry in which they worked, are excluded.
TABLE 1A (N = 243)
% of Total Responses % of Total Responses
Question Lawful Unlawful No Response Question Lawful Unlawful No Response
1 18.5 81.5 0 5 8.6 89.3 2.1
2 93.4 6.2 .4 6 81.5 16.0 2.5
3 20.6 79.4 0 7 8.6 88.9 2.5
4 10.3 87.7 1 2.0 8 10.7 87.2 2.1
153 That 7.7% of respondents answered this question "lawful" suggests some degree of
randomness or noise affected the results. Although a few respondents may have been con-
fused, or guessed randomly, the aggregate responses for the population surveyed exhibit
strong patterns which cannot be explained by chance.
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fying lawful discharges is 60.7%.154 Thus, in assessing their legal
rights, the respondents overwhelmingly erred in the same direction,
tending to believe discharges are unlawful when they are in fact
lawful.
Analysis of the results in Part I can be further refined. Two of the
eight questions presented rather obvious business reasons for dis-
missing an employee-unsatisfactory job performance (Part I, Ques-
tion 2) and lack of work (Part I, Question 6)-and respondents
generally understood that such discharges are lawful. This result is
not surprising given that these two reasons for discharge would be
lawful even under a just-cause standard.' 55 In this sense, questions 2
and 6 are not particularly useful in testing the respondents' under-
standing of the legal default rule of employment at will. 156 Both indi-
viduals who accurately understood the meaning of the at-will rule and
those who erroneously believed that the law requires an employer to
have just cause to discharge an employee should have been able to
answer these two questions correctly.
If questions 2 and 6 are eliminated, the remaining six questions
test more directly whether respondents believe that an employer may
lawfully fire an employee in the absence of a "good" reason. Two of
the six reasons for discharge-retaliation for reporting violations of
fire regulations (Part I, Question 5) and retaliation for refusing to
participate in illegal billing activities (Part I, Question 8)-involve vio-
lations of law and therefore are prohibited under the public-policy
exception to the at-will rule.157 The remaining four scenarios fall
squarely within the employer's prerogative to fire an employee for a
bad reason or no reason at all under the at-will rule, and the dis-
charges described are therefore lawful.
Looking only at these six questions-in which the employer fires
a worker for a reason unlikely to be sufficient under ajust-cause stan-
dard-respondents, on average, answered only 40% of the questions
correctly. As noted above, the errors are not randomly distributed.
Rather, for all six questions, respondents overwhelmingly believed that
discharges under the circumstances described are unlawful. The only
two questions that large majorities answered correctly (Part I, Ques-
154 If questions 2 and 6 are eliminated, the average error rate rises to 84.4%. See supra
Table 1. This figure arguably provides a more accurate assessment of respondents' under-
standing of the at-will rule. See infra text accompanying notes 155-56.
155 What is surprising is that a significant number of respondents believed that lack of
work is an insufficient reason for dismissing an employee.
156 Although questions 2 and 6 are not helpful in assessing a respondent's knowledge
of the at-will rule, they were included in order to provide some variation in the type of
situation presented. The goal of Part I was to describe a range of reasons for discharge
encompassing good cause, bad cause, and no cause. Questions 2 and 6 describe "good"
reasons for discharge.
157 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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tions 5 and 8) were those in which the discharges described are in fact
unlawful. For the remaining four questions, similar majorities per-
sisted in believing-erroneously in those situations-that the dis-
charge is prohibited. Thus, respondents consistently assumed that an
employee cannot be discharged without a good reason, apparently be-
lieving that workers have something akin to just-cause protection by
law.
FIGuRE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES IN PART I
63%
22%
5.2% 5.5%
.6% 3.1%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of Correct Responses to Part I,
Questions 1, 3-5, 7 and 8
The distribution of scores is also significant. Figure 1 illustrates
how respondents are distributed according to the total number of cor-
rect responses they gave. Although a few respondents have very high
or very low scores, by far the largest number of respondents-206, or
63%-answered only two of the six questions correctly. The next
most frequent score-three correct responses out of six-accounts for
another 22% of respondents. Thus, the mean level of correct re-
sponses-40%-represents not only an average score, but the most
prevalent level of understanding as well.158
158 If, instead, the data had a bimodal distribution with, for example, a large number
of respondents exhibiting very low scores and a similarly large number with high scores,
the average score might still be 40% correct, but the implications of such a finding would
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The results of Part III also reveal a significant degree of misun-
derstanding about the law. In each of the questions in Part III, the
reason for discharge is the same: the employer plans to hire another
person to do the same job at a lower wage, what I call a "pure cost-
saving discharge." What varies are the employer's statements regard-
ingjob security that might be interpreted as creating a binding con-
tract. As seen in the results summarized in Table 2, respondents again
appear to have overestimated the protections afforded by law, with
large majorities believing that pure cost-saving discharges under each
of the four circumstances described are unlawful, when in fact they
are not.1 59
TABLE 2
RESPONSES TO PART III OF SURVEY
(N=337)
Reason for discharge is constant. employer discharges employee in order to hire another
person to do the same job at a lower wage.
% of Total Responses
Nature of
Contract in Discharge
Nature of Employer Statement Missouri 1 6 0  Is Lawful Unlawful No Response
1. Personnel Manual states: At-will Lawful 36.2 62.6 1.2
"Company reserves the right to
discharge employees at any
time, for any reason, with or
without cause."
2. Company sends letter offer- At-will Lawful 13.9 84.9 1.2
ing "permanent employment."
3. Personnel Manual states: At-will Lawful 16.0 82.5 1.5
"If you successfully complete a
90 day probationary period,
you become a permanent em-
ployee."
4. Personnel Manual states: At-will Lawful 16.3 81.9 1.8
"Company will resort to dismis-
sal for just and sufficient cause
only."
Although Part Ill was originally intended to test whether respon-
dents believed that certain employer statements give rise to just-cause
protections, a difficulty arose in interpreting the aggregate data. By
be quite different. In such a situation, it would be far more plausible that the substantial
proportion of legally informed workers might have an impact on the market equilibrium
regarding job-security terms.
159 The Missouri Supreme Court made clear in Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745
S.W.2d 661, 662 (1988), that informal assurances ofjob security such as may be found in
an employee handbook, personnel manual, or offer letter are insufficient to overcome the
at-will presumption.
160 For a discussion of the case law surrounding the lawfulness of these discharges, see
supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text
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holding constant the reason for discharge-pure cost-savings in the
form of lower wages-but varying the employer statements that might
constitute a contractual promise ofjob security, I had intended to iso-
late the effect of those statements on the respondents' perceptions of
legal protection for the employee. However, because 82.2% of the
respondents indicated in Part I that they believed a pure cost-saving
discharge is unlawful, even without any promissory statements by the
employer, 161 the aggregate data for Part III conflate the responses of
those who mistakenly believed the employer's statements create en-
forceable legal rights and those who believed that a pure cost-saving
discharge is unlawful, regardless of what the employer does or does
not say.
In order to isolate the effect of the employer statements on the
respondents' perceptions of legal protection, I disaggregated the re-
sponses of those who initially believed a pure cost-saving discharge to
be lawful from those who believed it unlawful. Table 3 reports the
responses to Part III of the former group (i.e., all those whose answer
to Part I, Question I was "lawful"). Forty-five percent of these respon-
dents believed an otherwise lawful discharge to be unlawful when the
employer describes the employment as "permanent" (Part III, Ques-
tions 2 and 3). An even larger proportion-58%-changed their an-
TABLE 3
RESPONSES TO PART III BY RESPONDENTS WHO BELEVE A PURE
COST-SAVING DISCHARGE Is LAWFuL
(I.E., RESPONSE TO PART I, QUESTION 1 WAS "LAwFUL")
(N=60)
Reason for discharge is constant. employer discharges employee in order to hire another
person to do the same job at a lower wage.
% of Total Responses
Legal Rule
in Missouri:
Nature of Employer Statement Discharge Is Lawful Unlawful No Response
1. "Company reserves the right Lawful 90.0 10.0 0
to discharge employees at any
time, for any reason, with or
without cause."
2. Company sends letter offer- Lawful 55.0 45.0 0
ing "permanent employment."
3. "If you successfully complete Lawful 55.0 45.0 0
a 90 day probationary period,
you become a permanent em-
ployee."
4. "Company will resort to dis- Lawful 41.0 58.0 0
missal for just and sufficient
cause only."
161 See supra Table 1.
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TABLE 4
RESPONSES TO PART III BY RESPONDENTS WHO BELIEVE A PURE
COST-SAVING DISCHARGE Is UNLAWFUL
(I.E., RESPONSE TO PART I, QUESTION I WAS "UNLAWFUL")
(N=277)
Reason for discharge is constant: employer discharges employee in order to hire another
person to do the same job at a lower wage.
% of Total Responses
Legal Rule
in Missouri:
Nature of Employer Statement Discharge Is Lawful Unlawful No Response
1. "Company reserves the right Lawful 24.6 74.0 1.4
to discharge employees at any
time, for any reason, with or
without cause."
2. Company sends letter offer- Lawful 5.1 93.5 1.4
ing "permanent employment."
3. "If you successfully complete Lawful 7.6 90.6 1.8
a 90 day probationary period,
you become a permanent em-
ployee."
4. "Company will resort to dis- Lawful 10.8 87.0 2.2
missal forjust and sufficient
cause only."
swers from "lawful" to "unlawful" when the employer's personnel
manual states that the "[c] ompany will resort to dismissal for just and
sufficient cause only" (Part III, Question 4). Thus, even among re-
spondents who knew that an employer may lawfully discharge an em-
ployee solely in order to reduce its wage costs, a significant proportion
erroneously believed that informal employer statements, found in an
offer letter or personnel manual, create legally enforceable protec-
tions against dismissal.
Table 4 reports the responses to Part Ill of those who believed
that a pure cost-saving discharge is unlawful, even in the absence of
any contractual agreement regarding job security (i.e., all those whose
answer to Part I, Question 1 was "unlawful"). Not surprisingly, over-
whelming majorities in this group continued to believe a pure cost-
saving discharge is unlawful when the employer makes statements re-
ferring to "permanent" employment or a requirement of 'just and suf-
ficient cause" for dismissal (Part III, Questions 2-4). More surprising,
and more troubling, a very high proportion of these respondents-
74%-continued to believe that such a discharge is unlawful, even in
the face of an employer statement that it "reserves the right to dis-
charge employees at any time, for any reason, with or without cause"
(Part Im, Question 1). In other words, for nearly three-quarters of
those who had a pre-existing belief that the law limits an employer's
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right to discharge without cause, a strong disclaimer clearly describing
an at-will relationship had no effect on their prior beliefs.
The survey results indicate that respondents seriously overesti-
mated the level ofjob security afforded by law.' 62 These findings con-
flict with one of the basic assumptions underlying the neoclassical
economic defense of the at-will rule-that both employers and em-
ployees understand the terms of their bargain. Whether the assump-
tion is a faulty one, however, depends on the extent to which the
unemployment insurance claimants surveyed here are representative
of active job-seekers. In other words, can the results of this survey,
which reveal a profound misunderstanding of the most basic legal
rules governing the employment relationship, be generalized?
As an initial matter, the population surveyed is likely to be repre-
sentative of unemployment insurance claimants in the St. Louis re-
gion. The method of data collection is not biased towards any
particular subgroup within the population of unemployment insur-
ance claimants. Although the survey only captures the perceptions of
unemployment insurance claimants in a Midwestern metropolitan
area, there is no reason to believe, that workers in the St. Louis area
are particularly ill-informed about legal rules compared to their coun-
terparts elsewhere.
A more serious question is whether unemployment insurance
claimants are typical of all job-seekers. The population surveyed in-
cludes neither new entrants to the labor market, who are ineligible for
unemployment insurance benefits, nor the substantial number of
workers who move from job to job without experiencing a period of
involuntary unemployment. Finally, better compensated employees
162 One difficulty that may complicate any effort to document individual beliefs is the
possibility that individuals will be motivated by factors external to the survey to give less
than honest answers. For example, in this study, respondents were applying for unemploy-
ment insurance benefits, raising a risk that their responses might be distorted by a belief
that their answers would affect their receipt of benefits. Alternatively, respondents might
be tempted to give answers reflecting what they wished the law were given their recent
experience ofjob loss, rather than what they truly believe the law to be.
I attempted to minimize these risks in the following ways. First, the cover sheet of
each survey identified it as part of an academic research project, then stated in boldface
that the responses "WILL NOT BE SEEN BY ANYONE AT THE DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY."
This language emphasized that the responses would not influence the receipt of benefits,
and indeed, would not even be seen by the decisionmakers. Second, the prefatory instruc-
tions to Parts I and III of the survey direct respondents to "Answer each question according
to whether you believe a court of law would find the discharge to be lawful or unlawful,
NOT what you would like the result to be," highlighting the distinction between what the
law is and what it should be and focusing respondents' attention on their beliefs as to the
former.
Every methodology has its limits and so it remains possible that despite the cautionary
language, external motivations influenced responses to the survey. Ultimately, of course,
only further empirical study can evaluate the existence, direction, and extent of any such
influence.
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may be less likely to file for unemployment insurance benefits, even
when they experience an involuntary job loss. The lower proportion
of wage replacement for these workers, together with the greater like-
lihood that they have accumulated some savings to cushion the job
loss, makes it much less likely that they will go to the trouble of ap-
pearing at a local unemployment insurance office, filing a claim, and
reporting regularly to the agency in order to receive benefits.
The fact that new entrants to the labor market are by definition
excluded from the population surveyed is not particularly troubling.
If anything, new entrants are even ess likely than experienced workers
to be aware of and fully understand the applicable legal rules. If their
omission from the sample has any effect at all, it will bias the results in
favor of better informed workers.
Excluding job seekers who are currently employed, and hence
have no need of unemployment insurance benefits, is more problem-
atic. The population tested in this survey is distinguished by the fact
that most of them 163 are job losers-individuals who have been forced
back into the labor market as a result of an involuntary termina-
tion.'6 The direction of any bias that might result from surveying
workers who have experienced ajob loss, however, is unclear. On the
one hand, one might expect this group to be more knowledgeable
than the average worker. Having actually experienced an involuntary
termination, these workers may be less naive about the risks of dis-
charge, and likely will be better educated as to the legal rule permit-
ting employers broad discretion to fire their employees. Indeed,
defenders of the at-will rule have argued that the individual con-
163 I say "most" because a significant number of initial claimants for unemployment
insurance benefits are unemployed because they voluntarily quit their most recent job.
Such an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits unless he can show that he quit
for "good cause attributable to such work or to the claimant's employer," Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 288.050.1 (1) (West Supp. 1997). Unfortunately, no reliable figures exist as to the pro-
portion of initial claimants who are unemployed because they quit their most recent job.
Nevertheless, a rough estimate is possible. Comparing the number of agency determina-
tons regarding disqualification for a voluntary quit during a one year period ending Sep-
tember 30, 1996 with the number of new claims filed during that same period suggests that
approximately 18% of initial claimants lost their most recent job through a quit rather
than a layoff or firing. Robert Goulson, Research Analyst IV with the Missouri Division of
Employment Security, provided the numbers that form the basis for this calculation (Feb.
21, 1997 interview notes on file with author).
164 Generally, unemployment insurance benefits are available to "insured workers," de-
fined according to their prior earnings, see supra note 131, who have lost theirjobs through
no fault of their own. A claimant discharged for "misconduct connected with the claim-
ant's work" may be disqualified from receiving benefits for four to sixteen weeks, depend-
ing upon the seriousness of the misconduct. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.050.2 (West Supp.
1997). Thus, unemployment insurance recipients generally have been either laid off or
fired for reasons not amounting to serious misconduct. Unemployment insurance claim-
ants will also include those fired for serious misconduct, even though they may later be
disqualified in full or in part.
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tracting process can be relied on to produce an efficient result in part
because employees will surely learn from their past mistakes. For ex-
ample, Verkerke argues that "many nonunion workers will have exper-
ienced discharge themselves or have friends who have been
discharged, giving them an opportunity to discover the actual extent
of legal protections that are available.' 65 If this theory holds true,
then this survey underestimates rather than overestimates the degree of
employee misunderstanding of the law.
On the other hand, maybe workers who are better informed
about the law, who realize that they have no legal protection against
unjust discharge in the absence of a contract, can better protect them-
selves from involuntary termination and are therefore less likely to
appear among the unemployed. For example, a risk-averse employee
who fully understands the meaning of the at-will doctrine might seek
out unionized jobs in order to gain the just-cause protections of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, or make the effort to investigate pro-
spective employers' track records on dismissals and avoid workifig for
a company with a reputation for unfairness.' 66 If so, then unemploy-
ment insurance claimants are likely less knowledgeable than the aver-
age worker and this survey may overestimate the extent to which
employees are misinformed about the relevant legal rules.
Any tendency to overestimate employee misperceptions for this
reason, however, would apply only to the subset of unemployment in-
surance claimants who have been fired, not the substantial number
unemployed as a result of a quit or economic layoff.' 67 Because eco-
nomic layoffs are permissible even under a just-cause standard, the
165 Verkerke, supra note 2, at 887. Epstein and Morriss make similar arguments that a
learning process will take place for the discharged employee. Epstein, supra note 1, at 955
("If the arrangement turns out to be disastrous to one side, that is his problem; and once
cautioned, he probably will not make the same mistake a second time."); Morriss, supra
note 2, at 1929-30.
166 However, the legally informed employee is unlikely to negotiate an individual just-
cause contract. Doing so would require overcoming a number of strategic barriers. See
supra Part I. Moreover, observations of actual contracting practices, including Verkerke's
study, indicate that employers simply do not enter into such contracts except with a very
few highly skilled employees. Verkerke, supra note 2, at 866 n.126, 867 n.129.
167 Again, no reliable figures exist as to the number of unemployment insurance
claimants who quit or were laid off as opposed to being fired. However, it is possible to
estimate their proportion within a broad range. In response to a question on the survey
asking "have you ever been fired from a job?", more than 35% of those responding an-
swered "no." Because the question encompasses past experiences of job loss, this figure
provides a lower bound on the proportion of respondents who are currently unemployed
as a result of a layoff or quit, rather than a firing. An upper bound can be estimated by
examining the ratio of agency determinations regarding disqualifications for misconduct
to new claims-30%-which suggests that as many as 70% of claimants may be unem-
ployed due to a layoff or a quit rather than a firing. Robert Goulson, Research Analyst PV
with the Missouri Division of Employment Security, provided the numbers that form the
basis of this calculation. (Interview, Feb. 21, 1997).
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legally knowledgeable employee has no particular advantage in avoid-
ing these terminations. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that
legal knowledge correlates systematically with the likelihood of quit-
ting. Thus, even if true, the theory that legally informed workers can
better avoid involuntary terminations would not affect the results for a
substantial proportion of the population surveyed.
Ultimately, only further empirical testing can resolve this issue.
The most direct method of determining whether the unemployment
insurance claimants I surveyed are representative of all active job seek-
ers is to survey different groups of workers and compare the results.
With two competing hypotheses correlating the experience ofjob loss
with legal knowledge in opposite directions, it is impossible to predict
how the results reported here for unemployed workers might deviate
from the level of knowledge among job seekers generally. In the ab-
sence of any empirical evidence of the nature and direction of any
such bias, however, these data strongly indicate that worker mis-
perceptions about the law are significant and widespread.
As Tables 5 and 6 illustrate, respondents' understanding of the at-
will rule appears to correlate positively with the level of both educa-
tion and prior earnings. If, as hypothesized above, better educated
and better paid employees are underrepresented in this sample, the
survey's results of the survey may overstate the degree of misunder-
standing of the law in the workforce as a whole. Although the survey
data offer no direct measure of socio-economic status, respondents
were asked to provide their highest level of educational attainment.
Of those 25 years of age and older who responded to this question,
94% had completed high school, while only 14.8% had received a col-
lege degree. Roughly comparable statistics for the combined popula-
tion of St. Louis City and County are 76.9% and 25.3%,
respectively.168 Based on these figures, the population surveyed ap-
pears, if anything, weighted toward the middle of the scale in terms of
educational attainment.
168 The United States Bureau of the Census reports the percentage of persons 25 years
of age or over with a high school diploma or higher, and a Bachelor's degree or higher.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CouNT AND Ciw DATA BOOK 330 (1994). The
percentages reported in the text are derived by calculating a weighted average, based on
population, of the figures provided for St. Louis City and St. Louis County for 1990. These
figures for the population of St. Louis City and County are not limited to labor market
participants. Nevertheless, they give a rough sense of the representativeness of the survey
population with respect to educational attainment.
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE CORRECT RESPONSES IN PART I BY
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
1 6 9
% Correct Responses
in Part I, Excluding
% Correct Responses Questions 2 and 6
Educational Level in Part I (N = 320) (N = 322)
No high school diploma 46.9 (N = 20) 35 (N = 20)
High school diploma or equivalent 48.8 (N = 125) 37.5 (N = 125)
Associate or technical degree 50.8 (N = 30) 39.2 (N = 31)
Some college, no degree 52.8 (N = 102) 40.8 (N = 103)
College degree 56.0 (N = 25) 44.0 (N = 25)
Some graduate school or graduate degree 61.8 (N = 18) 50.0 (N = 18)
TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE CoRRECT RESPONSES IN PART I BY
EARNINGS LEVEL
170
% Correct Responses
in Part I, Excluding
Average Annual Earnings % Correct Responses Questions 2 and 6
(most recent job) in Part I (N = 288) (N = 290)
Less than $15,000 48.6 (N = 131) 37.0 (N = 131)
$15,000-24,999 53.0 (N = 78) 41.4 (N = 79)
$25,000-49,999 55.0 (N = 65) 42.2 (N = 66)
$50,000 and over 56.2 (N = 14) 44.0 (N = 14)
The effect of any resulting bias, however, should not be over-
stated. Even respondents with the highest educational and income
levels are seriously misinformed about the legal rules governing an
employer's right to discharge. As discussed above, a respondent's
score on Part I most accurately reflects her understanding of the at-
will rule when questions 2 and 6-poor work performance and lack of
169 An F test yielded statistically significant differences in the percentage of correct
responses between the levels of education. For the first column (% correct responses in
Part I), F=4.615, p=O, and for the second column (% correct responses in Part I, excluding
questions 2 and 6), F=3.53, p<.01. The number of responses reported in the two columns
is different due to slight variations in the number of respondents who answered each of the
questions necessary for calculating an average score on the total of eight (for the first
column) or six (for the second column) questions, and who provided a response to the
question regarding educational level.
170 An F test yielded statistically significant differences in the percentage of correct
responses between the levels of income. For the first column (% correct responses in Part
I), F=5.15, p<.01, and for the second column (% correct responses in Part I, excluding
questions 2 and 6), F=3.004, p<.05. The number of responses reported in the two columns
is different due to slight variations in the number of respondents who answered each of the
questions necessary for calculating an average score on the total of eight (for the first
column) or six (for the second column) questions, and who provided a response to the
question regarding income level.
[-Vol. 83:105
WORKER PERCEPTIONS
work-are eliminated because these reasons for discharge are lawful
under either an at-will or ajust-cause standard. When these two ques-
tions are excluded, the average level of correct responses for those
with some graduate education is 50% and for those with annual earn-
ings greater than $50,000 is 44%.171 Because the numbers of respon-
dents who fall into these two categories are quite small-18 and 14
respectively' 72 -and likely overlap, it is difficult to draw definitive con-
clusions about how strongly education and income influence the re-
sp6ndents' level of legal knowledge. Nevertheless, this study suggests
that although legal knowledge probably correlates positively with edu-
cation and/or income, a significant degree of misunderstanding of
the law persists even among the best educated and most highly com-
pensated workers. Based on their responses to the six diagnostic ques-
tions,1 7 3 these workers could not correctly identify whether a
discharge was lawful more than half the time.
In any case, it makes little sense to speak of a single labor market.
"The" labor market is composed of multiple, separate markets, each
populated by a different set of players. Thejanitor who never finished
high school obviously does not compete in the same labor market as
the engineer with a Ph.D. Even if better educated employees were
shown to be well informed about the law, this study suggests that at
least some labor markets, particularly those for less skilled labor, are
characterized by widespread information failures in the form of em-
ployee misperceptions about the level of job security protection af-
forded by law.
Part II of my survey was intended to explore the extent to which
employees are able to gather information about a prospective em-
ployer's policies and practices regarding termination before they accept
a job. The results, summarized in Table 7, suggest that a substantial
proportion of workers have access to some source of information re-
garding a prospective employer's dismissal policies. Only 22.6% of
respondents answered "no" to each of the questions listed in Table 7,
indicating that they had no information from any of the listed sources
about the risk of discharge at a particular firm.
Although these results suggest that a significant proportion of
workers have some relevant information, it is difficult to draw any
171 See supra Tables 5, 6.
172 See supra Tables 5, 6.
173 Recall that two of the eight questions in Part I of the survey describe reasons for
discharge that would be lawful under either a just-cause or at-will standard, and thus are
not useful in distinguishing those who believe they have just-cause protections from those
who truly understand the meaning of the at-will rule. See supra text accompanying notes
155-56. The term "diagnostic questions" refers to the remaining six questions that directly
test whether a respondent believes the employer may fire an employee in the absence of a
good reason. See supra pp. 135-36.
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TABLE 7
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN PART II REGARDING
INFORMATION GATHERING EXPERIENCES
Question % of Total Responses
Before you accepted your most recent job... Yes No Don't remember
did the employer give you a copy of an employee
handbook or personnel manual? 51.0 46.9 2.1
did the employer give you any written description of
its policies for discharging employees? 43.0 53.4 3.6
did the employer tell you verbally what its policies
were for discharging employees? 37.6 56.7 5.7
did anyone else (for example, a friend or family
member) tell you about the employer's policies for
discharging employees? 14.3 83.0 2.7
did you hear from anyone else (for example, a friend
or family member) whether the employer treats its
employees fairly or not? 32.2 62.7 5.1
strong conclusions from this data. First, the responses provide no in-
dication of the accuracy of the information obtained. Of even greater
concern, the results to Part I of the survey raise considerable doubts as
to the extent to which respondents can accurately assess and effec-
tively use the information they receive. If workers misunderstand the
legal rules governing the employment relationship, they are unlikely
to recognize the significance of specific employer policies. Put an-
other way, an employer's articulated dismissal policies may not appear
particularly significant to the employee who believes she cannot be
fired legally without just cause. Moreover, as seen in Table 7, the most
common way of obtaining pre-hire information about an employer
appears to be through receipt of an employee handbook, personnel
manual, or other written description of employer policies. Yet, as dis-
cussed above, the respondents' ability to process written information,
particularly when it contradicts their preconceived beliefs about the
law, appears to be quite limited. The results of Part II provide little
evidence of the quality of information obtained and the worker's abil-
ity to use it effectively. Yet these factors are far more significant than
the mere quantum of information gathered; after all, bad information
or the inability to process potentially useful information are them-
selves forms of market failure. Thus, based on this study, it is difficult
to evaluate whether workers are able to obtain sufficient information
about prospective employers to meaningfully negotiate issues of job
security.
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V
THEoRETicAL IMPLICATIONS: THE CASE FOR A
JUST-CAUSE DEFAULT
As discussed in Part I above, the efficiency argument in favor of
the at-will rule draws force from the prevalence of at-will contracts in
the real world and the faith that the observed market outcome reflects
an efficient bargaining process. This faith, however, rests on a
number of assumptions, including the assumption that workers have
full information, or at least sufficient information to protect their own
best interests in the contracting process. The results of this empirical
study cast serious doubt on that assumption, strongly indicating that
workers overestimate their legal rights, mistakenly believing that the
law affords them far greater protection against unjust discharge than
it in fact does.
These findings force a dramatic shift in the traditional economic
picture of the employment contracting process. Rather than assum-
ing that both employer and employee act "in full possession of their
faculties and their own interests,"' 74 the model of the labor market-
at least as to job security terms-must take into account that at least
one of the parties is likely seriously misinformed about the back-
ground rules against which bargaining takes place. Employees who
systematically overestimate the level ofjob protection afforded by law
will not be able to accurately assess the value of contractual guarantees
of job security, thus undermining their ability to negotiate effectively
over the issue. Nor can efficient bargaining be assumed to take place
implicitly; without an accurate understanding of the significance of an
employer's policies regarding dismissal, employees cannot make
meaningful comparisons between the compensation packages offered
by competing employers on the issue ofjob security. Put another way,
silence in the face of a presumption of at-will employment says little
about employees' preferences if they are wholly unaware of the de-
fault rule.
Defenders of the at-will rule are likely to respond to the findings
that workers are seriously mistaken about their legal rights by arguing
that information failure alone does not necessarily produce an ineffi-
cient outcome. For example, Schwartz and Wilde have argued that
consumer markets often remain competitive even in the face of im-
perfect information. 175 Contending that a focus on individual knowl-
edge and behavior is mistaken,176 they describe a model in which a
small proportion of well-informed searchers can drive the market
174 Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1098.
175 Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 23.
176 Id at 637-38.
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equilibrium toward a competitive price as firms compete for their
business. 77 Sp long as firms cannot discriminate effectively between
informed and uninformed consumers, this competition will tend to
drive down prices for all consumers, benefiting even uninformed mar-
ket participants. 78 Because they believe that "markets are likely to
behave much better in the face of imperfect information than is com-
monly supposed, 1 79 Schwartz and Wilde argue that imperfect infor-
mation alone cannot justify legal intervention. 80
Under their model, the ability of informed shoppers to influence
the market price depends upon the ratio of comparison shoppers to
the total number of shoppers in the market.' 8 ' If a sufficiently high
ratio of comparison shoppers is present, the market will generate
competitive prices and terms, and the efforts of the informed search-
ers will protect even uninformed market participants. 8 2 A smaller
proportion of comparison shoppers may not produce a competitive
equilibrium, resulting instead in a distribution of prices ranging up-
ward from the competitive price to the monopoly price. 8 3 Thus, the
crucial question, under Schwartz and Wilde's model, is whether the
proportion of informed consumers has fallen so low that the existence
of imperfect information actually results in noncompetitive prices and
terms.'
8 4
As they recognize, answering this question precisely entails enor-
mous practical difficulties. 185 Nevertheless, Schwartz and Wilde spec-
ulate that under certain conditions, the market for durable goods like
electric clothes dryers will produce competitive prices, even when as
177 Id. at 638. Of course, this model depends upon a number of assumptions.
Schwartz and Wilde assume that "in mass transactions it is usually too expensive for firms to
distinguish among extensive, moderate, and nonsearchers"; that "it would often be too
expensive to draft different contracts for each of these groups"; and that "the preferences
of searchers are positively correlated with the preferences of nonsearchers." Id. These
assumptions, however, do not necessarily hold true in all markets. See, e.g., Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. Ray. 1887, 1920 (1994) (arguing that
the necessary conditions are not present in the market for unsecured credit).
178 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 23, at 638.
179 Id. at 655.
180 Id. at 682.
181 Id. at 650.
182 Id.
183 See id.
184 See id. at 631.
185 Id. at 654-55. The mathematical model they develop for the consumer market re-
quires not only data on the ratio of comparison shoppers to the total number of shoppers,
but information regarding the "common limit price" (the maximum price consumers
would pay for a given product), each firm's fixed cost in producing the relevant good, the
marginal cost of production, and the "capacity constraint" (i.e., the "level of output that
minimizes average cost"). Id. at 650. Deriving reliable empirical estimates for any one of
these variables in a real consumer market would be a daunting task; finding comparable
measures in the market for a "good" like job security is virtually impossible.
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few as one-third of consumers engage in comparison shopping. 8 6 As-
suming its validity for the consumer market, their model suggests that
information problems do not necessarily result in market failure.
However, even if their model could appropriately be applied to the
labor market,187 it offers little assurance that the "market" for job se-
curity operates efficiently in light of the systematic misunderstanding
of the relevant legal rules documented in this study.
Attempting to apply the insights of their model to a complex
term like job security raises the difficult theoretical question of what it
means to be "informed." In Schwartz and Wilde's model, the compar-
ison shopper is by definition "informed" because they assume goods
are homogenous, and consumers are concerned only with price.188
Simply by visiting different stores and comparing prices, the compari-
son shopper "knows" all the relevant terms. Job security terms, by
contrast, are difficult to discover and understand. In order to effec-
tively compare the terms offered by different employers, the truly "in-
formed" worker not only needs to understand the meaning of the
legal presumption of at-will employment, she also must have suffi-
ciently accurate information about the discharge policies and prac-
tices of a particular firm.
Even if the analysis is simplified by focusing solely on legal infor-
mation, an adequate definition of what it means to be "legally in-
formed" is still required. In other words, when assessing the
proportion of "informed" market participants in the context of the
"market" for job security terms, how much knowledge is enough?
186 id. at 651-54. This figure is apparently not based on any empirical evidence, but
upon their assumptions that firms' standard markup on variable costs is 100%, that average
variable cost can be a proxy for marginal cost, that the average variable cost for an electric
clothes dryer is $200, and that the mean consumer limit price is $500. I have no idea
whether or not these are plausible assumptions for the durable goods market, but the
validity of their one-third figure obviously rests on the accuracy of these assumptions, as
well as on the theoretical soundness of their model.
187 There is reason to doubt that their model accurately describes the labor market.
They assume that consumers use a mixture of "sequential" and "fixed sample size" strate-
gies when searching for goods. Id. at 647-48. The "sequential" strategy entails visiting
firms in sequence "until the marginal cost of further search is greater than or equal to the
marginal gain." Id. at 643. The "fixed sample size" strategy entails choosing in advance a
fixed number of stores to visit and comparing the prices offered by each. Id at 646-47.
Workers, however, have significantly less control over their search strategies than the typi-
cal consumer. Their ability to "comparison shop" depends upon the number and timing
of job offers they receive. Once the worker receives an offer, the cost of continuing the
search-which may jeopardize the original offer-is far greater than the cost of merely
driving to another store, particularly if the worker is unemployed.
The potential gains from searching may also differ. For example, Schwartz and Wilde
note that the gain from continuing a search may include not only the prospect of finding a
better price, but also the pleasure of shopping itself. Id. at 648. Although this theory may
be plausible in the consumer market, it is hardly likely to apply to searches in the labor
market.
188 Id. at 642.
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Should a worker be considered "informed" only if she can accurately
identify all of the circumstances under which an employer can dis-
charge its employee without liability? Or is it sufficient to have a gen-
eral understanding that the at-will presumption permits the employer
broad latitude in terminating employment, without a precise under-
standing of the particulars? Framed in terms of this study, what per-
centage of correct responses to the survey questionnaire indicates that
a respondent is "legally informed"?
Any effort to quantify the matter masks far deeper questions
about what it means to "know" or to be "informed." Nevertheless, it is
useful to attempt a rough measure of the significance of this study's
findings. One possibility is to define "legally informed" workers as
those who correctly answered more than 50% of the diagnostic ques-
tions' 89 in Part I of the survey-i.e., those who were able to do better
than random chance. Using this very generous measure, the data
from this study suggest that fewer than 10% of the respondents in the
sample are "legally informed."190 Although the many differences be-
tween the labor and consumer markets make any direct comparisons
perilous, that 10% figure-well below the one-third proportion of in-
formed consumers Schwartz and Wilde conclude is sufficient for a
competitive market in durable goods'91-casts serious doubts on the
claim that the market for job security terms will behave competitively
even in the face of widespread information failure.
Because this study puts the efficiency of the individual con-
tracting process in doubt, the choice of a default rule is no longer
simple. Traditional economic theory teaches that a default rule
should be set at the terms the parties themselves, or at least most of
them, would have chosen in the absence of transactions costs, in order
to reduce the costs of reaching agreement. 192 Thus, defenders of the
at-will rule commonly argue that the frequency with which the at-will
contract is found in the real world indicates its desirability as a default
term.' 93 Their argument, however, ignores the possibility that the
parties may sometimes fail to bargain around a default rule, not be-
cause it is efficient, but because there are barriers to doing so.194 This
study confirms the existence of one such barrier-employee misap-
189 See supra note 173.
190 See supra Figure 1.
191 Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 23, at 651-53.
192 See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a Gen-
eral Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. Rzv. 967, 971 (1983).
193 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 948; Verkerke, supra note 2, at 874-75.
194 See Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract De-
fault Rules, 100 YALE LJ. 615, 619 (1990); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence:
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 866 (1992) (identifying as possible
barriers the costs of contracting around the rule and the possibility of lack of knowledge
about the rule).
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prehensions of the job security protections law affords. With strong
evidence that many employees do not know or understand the rele-
vant default rule, the observed market outcome can no longer be as-
sumed to be a reliable indicator of the true preferences of the parties.
Furthermore, without an easy way to determine what the parties would
prefer in the absence of transactions costs, the traditional economic
exhortation to set the default rule where the parties "would have
wanted" no longer offers clear guidance.
Ayres and Gertner propose an alternative theory of default rules,
arguing that under certain circumstances the default term should be
one the parties would not want. 95 Such "penalty default" rules are
appropriate when strategic considerations prevent a better informed
party from revealing relevant information-information that might
increase the contract's overall value-because concealing the infor-
mation will allow it to capture a greater portion of the gains from
contracting.1 96 In such a situation, a penalty default set contrary to
the interests of the better informed party will induce information
sharing.197
Issacharoff suggests that "employment is a prime arena for the
use of penalty default rules," 98 given that employees are disadvan-
taged by their relative lack of information going into the hiring pro-
cess. While the employer has access to inside information about the
firm, the employee cannot raise concerns about her long-term pros-
pects there without appearing to signal that she is a likely shirker. 99
The effect of this informational asymmetry is compounded by dispari-
ties in bargaining power 200 and certain cognitive limitations impairing
the employee's ability to fully anticipate at the time of hiring the con-
sequences of a discharge years later.20' Under these circumstances,
Issacharoff argues, a penalty default rule might appropriately induce
the employer-the party with superior information and bargaining
power-to clearly specify the terms of employment. 20 2
195 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
196 As Ayres and Gertner nicely put it, "[R]evealing information might simultaneously
increase the total size of the pie and decrease the share of the pie that the relatively in-
formed party receives. If the 'share-of-the-pie effect' dominates the 'size-of-the-pie effect,'
informed parties might rationally choose to withhold relevant information." Id at 99.
197 See id. at 98.
198 Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 1793.
199 1& at 1794-95.
200 Issacharoff compares the hiring process to "a first date between a polygamist and a
monogamist. The employer has entered into a number of contemporaneous courtships
such that there is a diversification of the risk associated with any individual affair. By con-
trast, the employee in a stable working relationship is restricted to faithful monogamy.... "
Id. at 1795.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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While Issacharoff focuses on the employer's superior access to in-
formation about the employee's future prospects with the firm, this
study suggests an additional informational asymmetry affecting the
contracting process-the employee's lack of knowledge of the rele-
vant default rule. If employees mistakenly believe that employers
must have just cause to fire them, employers who know better will
have little incentive to inform them of the true default rule. By keep-
ing silent, employers can retain the benefit of a legal right to fire at
will without having to offer higher wages to compensate their employ-
ees for the lack ofjob security. In contrast, if the default rule requires
just cause for termination, employers who value the unconstrained
right to discharge would have strong incentives to explain the legal
default to prospective employees and to bargain with them for a
change of terms.20 3
Of course, a finding that employers are no better informed about
the relevant legal rules than employees would weaken this argument.
Although no systematic study of the issue apparently exists, Verkerke's
observations suggest that a significant degree of confusion exists
among employers as well.20 4 Still, it is unlikely that misapprehensions
about the law on the part of employers are as widespread or as serious
as they appear to be among employees. First, employers, particularly
large employers, are far more likely than individual employees to have
access to legal counsel who can inform them of the correct rule.
Moreover, employers are repeatedly and frequently players in the la-
bor market. The experiences of even a modest-sized employer-accu-
mulated from simultaneous relationships with multiple employees
over long periods of time-are likely to vastly exceed the cumulative
job market experience of any single individual, even the unreformed
job-hopper (who is unlikely to care much about long-term job security
anyway). As Ayres and Gertner remark, "[i]f one side is repeatedly in
the relevant contractual setting while the other side rarely is, it is a
sensible presumption that the former is better informed than the lat-
ter.'"205 Given that the employer likely has superior information about
the relevant legal rules, the issue of job security seems precisely the
sort of situation calling for the use of a penalty default.
Although I have focused thus far on the implications of my em-
pirical findings for the efficiency-based defense of the at-will rule, con-
cerns about autonomy reinforce the case for moving to a just-cause
default. The principle of freedom of contract is often invoked in the
203 Ayres and Gertner suggest that the rationale for imposing a penalty default against
the relatively informed party is particularly strong "when the uninformed party is also unin-
formed about the default rule itself." Ayres & Gertner, supra note 195, at 98.
204 See supra note 105.
205 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 195, at 98.
[Vol. 83:105
WORKER PERCEPTIONS
employment context, not only because it tends "to promote the effi-
cient operation of labor markets," but also because it "advance [s] indi-
vidual autonomy."20 6 However, if most workers are seriously mistaken
about the legal rules governing the employment relationship, as this
study suggests, then their "choice" not to contract around the at-will
default by remaining silent is illusory. When the default rule is not
only unknown to workers, but also contrary to their widely held be-
liefs, imposing the at-will term does not advance autonomy.
Barnett argues that taking seriously the role of consent in con-
tracts requires choosing "'conventionalist default rules"'-rules that
reflect commonly shared expectations in the relevant community.20 7
Such an approach increases the likelihood that when default terms
are brought into play to fill a contractual gap, they will actually reflect
what the parties would have wanted if they had expressly addressed
the issue. When both parties know the default rule and the costs of
contracting around it are low, their silence on the matter can be taken
as consent.208 However, presuming consent is more problematic if
the default rule is costly to discover or to contract around.20 9 Never-
theless, when the parties tacitly share certain commonly held assump-
tions, they may implicitly have intended the same thing, even though
they never discussed or even consciously considered the particular is-
sue. In such a case, Barnett asserts, a default rule that coincides with
conventional understanding is most likely to mirror the parties' inten-
tions, whether consciously held at the time of contract formation or
not.2 1
0
According to Barnett, this consent-based approach to selecting
default rules further suggests that when only one party is likely to
know the law, the default rule should reflect "the commonsense un-
derstanding of the community to which the rationally ignorant party
belongs."21 ' Such a rule increases the likelihood that any resulting
agreement will truly reflect the parties' intentions because the legally
knowledgeable party will expressly bargain over the issue whenever it
206 Epstein, supra note 1, at 951.
207 Barnett, supra note 194, at 875.
208 See id at 866. In such a situation, the content of the default tule is relatively unim-
portant because the parties can easily negotiate around it if they prefer alternative terms.
209 See id.
210 Id at 876-82.
211 Id at 895. The "rationally ignorant party" is one who is involved in small one-shot
or infrequent transactions, making it irrational to incur the costs of learning the default
rule. See id at 886. According to Barnett, when contracting with the one-shot player, "the
onus should fall upon the repeat player to contract around the [default] rule." Id. at 892.
Although workers today are rarely "one-shot" players in the strictest sense, they are "play-
ers" on the labor market far less frequently than employers. Because the costs to them of
learning the correct rule are significantly greater than for employers, and because they
appear to be unaware of the current default rule, workers are the "rationally ignorant
parties" to the employment contract under Barnett's consent theory of contract.
1997]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
seeks terms that deviate from the conventional understanding of the
rationally ignorant party.21 2 Because employers are more likely to be
legally informed than workers,218 a consent-based theory of contract
suggests that the default rule in employment should reflect workers'
commonly held belief that discharge must be based on cause.
Thus, given the widespread misunderstanding of the at-will rule
among workers, theoretical considerations of both efficiency and au-
tonomy point in the direction of adopting a just-cause default.
Whether such a change in the default rule would in fact make individ-
ual bargaining over job security more efficient, however, depends
upon a number of unknown factors. For example, even in the ab-
sence of significant information problems, the possibility remains that
cognitive limitations, signaling problems, or the public goods nature
of just-cause terms may distort the labor market for job-security
terms.214 Moreover, this study raises the concern that even imposing a
just-cause "penalty default" may not achieve its purpose of improving
the bargaining process by inducing information sharing. Recall that
in this study, three-quarters of respondents who thought that the law
protects an employee against a pure cost-saving discharge persisted in
that erroneous belief even in the face of an employer statement that it
reserves the right to fire for any reason at all.215 This finding suggests
that a simple disclaimer will be ineffective in informing workers of
their legal status, especially when it contradicts their pre-existing be-
liefs about their legal rights.
Raising the barriers to contracting around the just-cause default
might address this latter concern. For example, courts could require
clear and unambiguous evidence of the parties' assent to an at-will
relationship in order to insure that employers had carefully and fully
explained both the meaning of a just-cause standard and the loss of
job tenure rights a move to an at-will contract would entail. Of course,
the more difficult it becomes to contract around a default rule, the
more closely it will resemble an immutable rule.2 16 Justifying a
mandatory just-cause standard on grounds of economic efficiency,
however, requires far more evidence than this study offers. For even if
the presence of widespread information failure casts doubt on the effi-
ciency of the individual bargaining process, a mandatory just-cause re-
quirement has yet to be proven more efficient. As Dau-Schmidt argues,
212 1& at 895.
213 If it turns out that employers and workers share the same misapprehensions about
the law, a consent-based theory of contract would still suggest adoption of a just-cause
default rule as reflecting the conventional understandings in the relevant community. See
id. at 880-81.
214 See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
215 See supra Table 4.
216 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 195, at 120; Epstein, supra note 1, at 952.
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any policy prescription must take into account not only the failures of
individual bargaining, but also the ability of alternative institutions to
effectively address issues ofjob security.217 Making such a comparison
of institutional competencies calls for further empirical study, both to
test the other allegations of market failure raised by critics of the at-
will rule as well as to estimate the costs of alternative legal regimes.
Without clear empirical findings, the theoretical arguments based on
economic efficiency simply cannot provide a determinative answer to
the normative question of how far the law should go in protecting the
worker's interest in job security.
CONCLUSION
For too long, the debate over the at-will rule has proceeded pri-
marily on theoretical grounds. Critics and defenders alike have relied
on theory to argue for reforming or maintaining the traditional rule.
However, theory is only as good as the assumptions on which it rests.
Moreover, when opposing sides begin with very different assumptions,
pure theory offers no way of resolving the dispute.
Empirical work provides a means for testing the competing intu-
itions-often unarticulated-that so often underlie disputes over the
content of law. This study presents such a test of the assumptions
about the accuracy of workers' information that underlie the debate
over the at-will rule. The results strongly indicate that the assumption
of full information implicit in the market-based defense of the at-will
rule is a flawed one. Of course, a single study cannot definitively re-
solve difficult and disputed questions, even empirical ones. However,
if skeptics question whether the population surveyed here is truly rep-
resentative of the workforce, the best way to resolve such doubts is
through careful empirical testing of other sample populations, not
further speculation. Moreover, until such studies produce contrary
results, the findings documented here offer uncontradicted evidence
that workers systematically overestimate their legal protections against
arbitrary and unjust discharge.
Throughout this Article, I have focused on efficiency arguments
to the neglect of fairness considerations. This limitation necessarily
followed from the nature of my inquiry, which narrowly focused on
one crucial assumption implicit in arguments over the efficiency of
the at-will rule. In so limiting my discussion, I have not meant to sug-
gest that concerns based on fairness and justice have no role in shap-
ing legal rules. To the contrary, such concerns are not only
appropriate, but ultimately inescapable. By contradicting a key as-
sumption of the traditional economic defense of the at-will rule, this
217 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 6, at 1646.
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study undermines the faith that observed market outcomes reflect an
efficient solution. But though its findings are more consistent with
assumptions commonly made by critics of the at-will rule, these data
offer no certainty that a mandatory just-cause requirement would
prove more efficient. At most, the results of this study suggest the
appropriateness of a just-cause default rule. However, predicting the
practical effect of such a change in the default rule requires an explo-
ration of additional factors beyond the scope of this study.
Further empirical work will undoubtedly shed greater light on
the relative costs and benefits of varying legal regimes, but I suspect
that efficiency considerations alone will never provide a determinate
answer to the choice of a legal rule. For outside the realm of theory,
the practical difficulties involved in "proving" the superior efficiency
of one rule over another are enormous and likely intractable. More-
over, arguments relying solely on grounds of efficiency ignore the
deeper question of whether, as a normative matter, efficiency con-
cerns should control. Though my focus here has been on the compet-
ing market arguments, I believe that ultimately the choice of a legal
rule assigning job-tenure rights must encompass concerns far broader
than mere efficiency.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONS REGARDING LEGAL KNOWLEDGE
[PARTS I AND III OF SURVEY]
PART I
This section describes different cases in which an employee is dis-
charged from his job. For each case, you will be asked whether the
discharge was lawful or unlaful.
In each case, the employee is NOT represented by a union and the employee
was NOT discharged because of his or her race, sex, national origin, religion,
age or disability.
Also, there is no formal written or oral agreement between the employee and
employer stating the terms of the employment.
Answer each question according to whether you believe a court of law
would find the discharge to be lawful or unlawful, NOT what you
would like the result to be.
1. Company discharges Employee in order to hire another person to
do the same job at a lower wage. Employee's job performance has
been satisfactory. The discharge is:
lawful unlawful
2. Company discharges Employee because of unsatisfactory job per-
formance. The discharge is:
lawful - unlawful_
3. Employee is discharged because he reported to his supervisor that
another employee has been stealing company property. The dis-
charge is:
lawful unlawful
4. Employee is discharged because Company mistakenly believes
Employee has stolen money. Employee is able to prove in court that
Company is mistaken. Employee's job performance has been satisfac-
tory. The discharge is:
lawful unlawful
5. Employee is a cook and sees several violations of fire regulations
at the restaurant. Employee complains to supervisor of the violations,
then reports them to a government agency. Employee is discharged
for reporting the violations. The discharge is:
lawful unlawful
6. Company discharges Employee because there is no longer
enough work. The discharge is:
lawful - unlawful_
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7. Employee is accused of dishonesty. Supervisor knows that Em-
ployee is not dishonest, but discharges him anyway, because he dis-
likes Employee personally. Employee's job performance has been
satisfactory. The discharge is:
lawful __ unlawful
8. Employee discovers that Company has been violating the law by
charging customers for services which were not actually provided.
Employee is discharged because he refuses to participate in Com-
pany's illegal billing practices. The discharge is:
lawful -__ unlawful
[Questions from Part II regarding respondents' information gather-
ing experiences appear in Appendix B.]
PART III
In each case below, the employee is NOT represented by a union and the
employee was NOT discharged because of his or her race, sex, national origin,
religion, age or disability.
Answer each question according to whether you believe a court of law
would find the discharge to be lawful or unlawful, NOT what you
would like the result to be.
1. Company's Personnel Manual states that "Company reserves the right
to discharge employees at any time, for any reason, with or without cause."
Employee performs his job satisfactorily for several years. The Com-
pany discharges Employee in order to hire another person to do the
same job at a lower wage. The discharge is:
lawful __ unlawful
2. Company sends a letter to Employee offering "permanent employ-
ment." Employee accepts the offer and performs his job satisfactorily
for several years. The Company discharges Employee in order to hire
another person to do the same job at a lower wage. The discharge is:
lawful __ unlawful
3. Company's Personnel Manual states that "If you successfully complete
a 90 day probationary period, you become a permanent employee." Based on
this statement, Employee leaves his currentjob to work for Company.
Employee passes the probationary period and performs his job satis-
factorily for several years. The Company discharges Employee in or-
der to hire another person to do the same job at a lower wage. The
discharge is:
lawful __ unlawful
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4. Company's Personnel Manual states that "Company will resort to dis-
missal for just and sufficient cause only." Based on this statement, Em-
ployee leaves his current job to work for Company. Employee
performs his job satisfactorily for several years. The Company dis-
charges Employee in order to hire another person to do the same job
at a lower wage.
The discharge is:
lawful - unlawfil_
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APPENDIX B
QUESTIONS REGARDING INFORMATION GATHERING
EXPERIENCES [FROM PART II OF SURVEY]
The questions in this section ask about your beliefs and exper-
iences regardingjob security. 'Your most recentjob" means your cur-
rent job, or, if you are unemployed, your last job (other than
temporary or contract work).
Before you accepted your most recent job, did the employer give you a
copy of an employee handbook or personnel manual?
Yes __ No __ Don't remember
Before you accepted your most recent job, did the employer give you
any written description of its policies for discharging employees?
Yes __ No __ Don't remember
Before you accepted your most recent job, did the employer tell you
verbally what its policies were for discharging employees?
Yes __ No __ Don't remember
Before you accepted your most recent job, did anyone else (for exam-
ple, a friend or family member) tell you about the employer's policies
for discharging employees?
Yes __ No __ Don't remember
Before you accepted your most recent job, did you hear from anyone
(for example, a friend or family member) whether the employer treats
its employees fairly or not?
Yes __ No __ Don't remember
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